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Contemporary African states make up a substantial number of states that are regarded to be 
failing. Somalia is moreover considered as the epitome of a failed state; it has been regarded as a 
collapsed state since 1991. In this view, an important characteristic of a state is its possession of 
“the monopoly of the legitimate use of force” (Weber 1919:1) in its territory/jurisdiction. States 
institutions have to be robust to control and provide security to its citizenry. When these state 
institutions are not robust enough and thus cannot perform their mandated tasks; the society will 
depreciate into anarchy owing to the lack of order meant to be provided by the state. Expectedly, 
with a lack of a central government, Somali society was seen to be in turmoil and in a state of 
anarchy. Contrary to this claim, Somalia has developed effective mechanisms embedded in their 
local settings to offer services that would ideally be regarded as government’s responsibilities. 
The provision of education, health services, security and general maintenance of order is assured 
by interested business men and elders whose authority is reinforced by the governed society. 
State failure theory does not however allow for this reality since it equates the absence of a 
central government to disorder in the society. This is owing to its account of a state that is devoid 
of a society. To remedy this misconception, I propose Migdal’s (1994) state in society approach. 
In this approach, the state is one of the many organizations of the society. There exists between 
society and the state continuous engagements which yield struggles or accommodations that are 
mutually transforming. Seen in this light, Somalia is not a failed state. The condition simply 
reveals the struggles, accommodations and general interactions between the state and the 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction and topic overview 
1.1 Background and outline of the research problem: 
Our current international order is essentially dominated by western ideals and standards of living 
and governing. This dominance has amplified into a norm such that political order is 
predetermined by and ought to abide by those set of principles. Notwithstanding the fact that 
some of these principles are useful and are worth to follow, at times, they act contrary to 
improving or providing an accurate condition of the social, economic, or political affairs of 
spaces outside the western setting. The theory of state-failure in Africa is a case of such an 
instance. It has been a norm that when analyses of African states are given, they commonly get 
compared with the western ideals of liberal democracy (rationally so, given that western 
standards are considered to be the universally accepted ones). African states are commonly 
characterized by negative connotations in general sociological or political theories. The state 
failure literature distinguishes three different but progressively deteriorating stages. The first 
category is called failing states (states which are in the process of failing); when not rectified 
appropriately, this stage can progress to the following category of failed states. The final 
category is a progression of failed states, which are completely collapsed states. Here the state is 
said to have disintegrated to a point of non-existence facilitating total collapse.  
Although existing literature on state failure has been able to outline the above categories; there is 
still no clear single agreed upon definition of what state failure is. This has allowed for a number 
of definitions and causes of failure. Owing to a number of divergent historical challenges, it 
holds true that contemporary African states are faced with a number of social and economic 
challenges. These states have thus been susceptible to being regarded as weak, failing, failed or 
completely collapsed. The reason for this failure is often attributed to internal factors. The 
possibility of external forces and realities causing disruptions and challenges to states is 
disregarded. The description of failure is also not context specific but merges states from 
different regions with different history and realities into one description. This arrangement has 
allowed for single or similar intervention recommendations for diverse problems. The paramount 
recommendation from state failure proponents being the creation of more order through robust 
government institutions and the strengthening of the security sector. The concept of 
strengthening the security sector gained momentum post the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
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in the United States. Driven by the quest to deter future attacks and fight terrorism; interventions 
were sanctioned to states regarded as weak, failing or have failed already. This was deduced 
from a supposed susceptibility of failed states to terrorists. It is argued that, since failed states 
lack complete control of their territories; these uncontrolled territories can be used by terrorists 
who can perform their operations undetected.        
 State failure theory describes the state as an entity that is above the society it exists in. It thus 
disregards societal forces that engage with and can change the nature of the state through this 
engagement. It equates the lack of a central government to total disorder and anarchy in the 
society. Somalia existed without a central government for over 20 years, and should have fallen 
into anarchy in terms of state failure theory. In reality however, the Somali society has been able 
to devise mechanisms that ensure service delivery, security and general control of social and 
economic interactions. State failure theory cannot account for this reality since it confuses the 
lack of a central government with disorder in the society. This is owing to its account of a state 
that is devoid of a society. To remedy this misconception, I propose a state in society approach. 
In this approach, the state is one of the many organizations of the society. There exists between 
society and the state continuous engagements which yield struggles or accommodations that are 
mutually transforming. Seen in this light, Somalia is not a failed state. The condition simply 
reveals the struggles, accommodations and general interactions between the state and the 
different Somali social forces. 
1.2 Key questions to be asked: 
1) What is the notion of the state that is assumed by the discourse of state failure theories?  
2) Does state failure theory provide an accurate account of the status of Somali political 
terrain? 
3) Does state failure theory help understand and consequently resolve issues that cause 
disputes in Somalia? 
1.3 Objectives of the study: 
1. To articulate the notion of the state that is assumed by state failure theories. 
2. To evaluate the accuracy of state failure theory’s account of Somali’s political terrain. 
3 
 
3. To ascertain whether state failure theory helps resolve the issues underlying the conflict 
in Somalia. 
1.4 Research methodology: 
A research methodology is concerned with what phenomenon is being studied and with or 
through what means. In the field of social sciences, two research methodologies are 
conventionally used when conducting research. One can make use of the either the qualitative or 
the quantitative research method. In some instances, a number of social scientists have also 
preferred to use of combination of these two traditions, this is referred to as mixed methods. The 
mixed method is supposed to be more beneficial for it offers the researcher advantages of both 
the qualitative and quantitative approach. Quantitative research measures or count issues so as to 
generalize these findings to a broader population. The emphasis of a quantitative research is thus 
on gathering and examining mathematically measurable data. It focuses on measure, scale, range 
or rate of incidents (Wyse, 2011). Quantitative research is generally comprehensive and 
organized with findings that can be assembled and presented statistically. The overall objective 
of a quantitative study is to measure data and broaden findings from a section or part to the 
population of interest (ibid). 
By contrast, qualitative research seeks to understand or explain behavior and beliefs. It identifies 
processes and appreciates contexts of people’s experiences. It aims at in-depth description 
through its concentration on particular meaning, process and context (Cohen & Manion, 1994). 
The purpose of a qualitative study is to understand social phenomena of multiple realities from 
their point of views. Strauss and Corbin (1990) state that a qualitative research is whatever type 
of research that produces results without means of numbers. Similarly, Shimahara (1988) holds 
that qualitative research produces findings that cannot be obtained by means of statistical 
methods. Qualitative research methods grant extra importance on interpretation and the provision 
of thorough observations in their contexts and an extensive understanding of concepts. 
Qualitative research is primarily exploratory in nature (Wyse, 2011). Primarily, it is utilized for 
purposes of gaining understanding of fundamental motives or reasons, views and motivations. It 
provides a deep understanding of a problem thus assisting with developing possible solutions and 
hypotheses for a prospective quantitative research study. Qualitative research is furthermore used 
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to discover inclinations of thought and opinions (ibid) and thus assists in gaining a deeper 
understanding of a problem. 
The one stark difference between the two traditions is that quantitative research is impartial and 
objective whilst qualitative research is particular and subjective. Quantitative research provides 
observed effects and generalizes them to a population. Qualitative research on the other hand 
describes the difficulty or condition from the standpoint of those experiencing it. This 
explanation cannot be subsequently generalized into a population without considering the 
context. The methodology that is used for this research project is the qualitative research method. 
This is due to the investigative disposition of this research method. This research project seeks to 
understand better the notion of a state as utilized by the state failure theory. To achieve this, I 
will use and analyze data that already exists in a form of previous research. These secondary 
sources used include published books, journals, newspaper articles, official statistics, and web or 
internet information. 
The research will also make use of a case study to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
state failure theory and its application in Africa. As a research approach, case studies are used 
where the emphasis of the research is getting a detailed understanding of a specific phenomenon, 
object, institution, person or an event at a particular period (Willig, 2008). Informed by this; case 
studies are consequently not characterised by the research method used in conducting the study 
but by their focus on a particular unit (a case) that is being analysed (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Their 
definition rests on individual cases and not on the method of inquiry used (Stake, 1995). Case 
studies can deal with either single or multiple cases. A single case study is used when 
investigating a single phenomenon whilst a multiple case study is used when investigating more 
than one cases. Single case studies come in two main types: intrinsic and instrumental case 
studies. From multiple case studies comes one type: a collective case study. These three main 
types of case studies, intrinsic, instrumental and collective were identified by Stake (1995). He 
argued that in an intrinsic case study, a rare or unique phenomenon is studied informed by its 
uniqueness or difference from other cases. In an instrumental case study, a specific case is used 
to gain a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon, the chosen case study is not however 
necessary unique or different from others. Primarily, instrumental case studies are not only used 
to provide insight on an issue but also to reconsider or redraw a generalization. The case used is 
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therefore of secondary interest. It takes a supporting role while facilitating for an understanding 
of something else. The case will still be studied in-depth and its context s scrutinized. This is 
however done for helps in the gaining deeper understanding of an external interest (Yin, 2009). 
The case used in this research can be referred to as an instrumental type of case study. The case 
of Somalia is not used as an intrinsic case; the interest is not solely on the case of Somalia but on 
a general idea of state failure in Africa. Somalia is used instrumentally to show how state failure 
does not capture the realities of African states. Somalia as a case study supports the argument 
that the state failure theory does not capture the realities of what happens in African states. In a 
collective case study, multiple cases are studied either simultaneously or successively to still gain 
a comprehensive understanding of a phenomena or a particular issue (ibid).  
These three categories are not however mutually exclusive. A case study can embody more than 
one of these categories in the same or single study. It is possible that a case study begins as an 
intrinsic but develops into an instrumental or collective case study as the investigation or 
research progresses (ibid). Case studies can be used to test a specific proposition (Lijphart, 
1971). As a result, they can either be theory-confirming or theory-infirming (ibid). It is for this 
reason that a case study method is used in this research. The state of Somalia is used as a case to 
test the accuracy of the assumptions of state failure theory. The case will either confirm or infirm 
these assumptions. Lijphart (1971) refers to studies that are theory-infirming as deviant case 
analysis. Such studies make use of single cases known for their lack of conformity to the 
established generalizations. Cases are used to show why they deviate from established 
generalizations. This further helps to uncover additional variables that may have not been 
considered previously or help in refining definitions of some or all of the variables involved 
(ibid). This study can therefore be referred to as a deviant case analysis as the case of Somalia is 
used to infirm and not to confirm the state failure theory in Africa. 
1.5 Significance of the study: 
In publications of organisations such as The Fund for Peace, The Global Peace, Business Insider 
and Foreign Policy, which annually publish Fragile States and State Failure Indexes, African 
states dominate the lists in comparison to other continents. These organisations and state failure 
proponents use Max Weber’s definition of a state. This definition is sanctioned as the only 
applicable definition and disregards other forms of state that can exist outside the Weberian 
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western context. Furthermore, post the 9/11 terrorist attacks, being regarded as a failed state has 
intervention and policy implications owing to the alleged link between failed states and 
terrorism. In light of these implications, it is important to evaluate the accuracy of the account of 
the state provided by the state failure theory. The significance of this study thus rests in the 
theoretical value it will add concerning the state failure thesis’s applicability in Africa and 
particularly in Somalia. 
1.6 Limitations of the Study 
Conceivable limitations of this research are informed by the research designed used, which is the 
qualitative research method. Such limitations are referred to as study design limitations (Hindle, 
2015). This design solely uses secondary research sources as research data. These are already 
existing, published research sources (ibid) such as books, journal articles, internet sources, 
newspapers, conference papers, working papers and more. What is limiting about these 
secondary sources is the fact that they may not be accurately appropriate for the need of the 
study. Conducting research can thus be time consuming as the researcher needs to make proper 
scrutiny of the information and make suitable modifications where required (Denscombe, 2008). 
It is also possible that suitable data may not be available (ibid). Owing to the study being 
library/desktop based, it can lack practicality as opposed to a study conducted on the ground. The 
quality of the research is greatly reliant on the researcher’s individual skills to interpret data (UK 
Essays, 2013). The deduced research conclusion can therefore be easily influenced by the 
researcher’s individuality and biases. The researcher can also fabricate facts. Due to the research 
being context specific, in this case Africa specific; drawn conclusions are limited to Africa and 
cannot be extended or generalized to other parts of the world. The complete reliance on 
secondary sources is also disadvantageous as the available data may be incorrect or outdated 
(ibid). 
 
1.7 Definitions of Important Terms 
 Bureaucracy: An administrative or social system that relies on a set of rules and 
procedures, separation of functions and a hierarchical structure in implementing controls 
over an organization, government or social system. 
7 
 
 Colonialism: the policy or practice of acquiring full or partial political control over 
another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it economically. 
 Extremism: the holding of extreme political or religious views; also referred to a 
fanaticism. 
 Jihad: (among Muslims) a war or struggle against unbelievers, can also be regarded as 
holy war 
 Regime: a government, especially an authoritarian one. 
 State: a nation or territory considered as an organized political community under one 
government. 
 Terrorism: the unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit 
of political aims. 
 
1.8 Study Overview 
The study consists of four chapters: 
Chapter one provides an introduction of the research topic. A concise background of the 
research topic is provided and the context in which the research study will be limited to is 
explained. The chapter further delineates questions, objectives, significance of the study, 
limitations of the study and the research methodology utilized to conduct the study. 
Chapter two provided an in-depth description of the definition of the state embedded in the state 
failure theory. It also provides a comprehensive description of what constitute to state failure and 
the various categories of failed states. Policy and intervention implications that accompany state 
failure are also explained, but limited to the African context. A different approach or definition 
of a state and how it operates is lastly given and adopted instead of the definition advocated by 
the state failure theory. 
Chapter three uses the case study of Somalia to show how state failure theory has been applied 
in Africa and how interventions and policies drawn from the state failure theory have been 
detrimental to Somali due to the misconceptions of the African state and how it operates or ought 
to operate. It also illustrates how these ill-conceived interventions have been detrimental to the 
Somali society as they fail to capture the everyday realities of the society. 
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Chapter four provides concluding remarks to the study, reiterating the misconceptions of the 




Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives a background and a comprehensive summary of the definition of the state 
embedded in the state failure theory, which is Weber’s definition of the state. It describes how 
Weber’s ideal state ought to operate and what the best form of government for this state is. It 
then describes the opposite of this state which by deduction is held to entail failure. The different 
levels of failure are then described along with their variant causes. The links a failed state has 
with both development and terrorism are explained and how these have been used in African 
states. A different definition and outlook to what constitute a state and how it ought to operate is 
finally given and adopted instead of the definition advocated by the state failure theory. 
2.2 The state in state failure theory 
How one defines what is a state or what constitutes statehood is paramount to the understanding 
of state failure. State failure theorists use a definition of the state developed by Max Weber. 
Weber did not believe that the definition of a state could be found in terms of its ends but only in 
terms of the particular means limited to it, primarily, the “use of physical force” (Weber, 1958: 
77).  Weber believed that the foundation of every state is force. He claimed that, if there was no 
social institution conscious of the use of force; the idea of a state would be erased and a 
condition of anarchy would emerge. The exact definition of the state that Weber (1919) 
developed cited in Gert and Mills (1946:1) is “a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Territory is essential 
for it demarcates the scope of the state’s authority (Gert & Mills, 1946). Deducible from this 
description are three pertinent attributes qualifying a state, namely, monopoly/control, 
force/violence and territory. The second attribute (force/violence) can be assigned to other 
institutions or individuals but will be limited to the extent to which the state permits or restricts 
the use of force. In this manner, the state is regarded as the only and exclusive source of the right 
to utilize violence (ibid). 
The society existing within this Weberian state is not homogenous. Owing to unequal ownership 
of power; people are unequal for they possess and exercise different levels of power or influence. 
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Karl Marx, a prominent sociologist to write on social inequality or stratification believed that 
inequality was due to economic factors. Inequality existed because of the unequal ownership of 
wealth and of the control of material goods. The wealthy have power and control over the poor. 
This setting consists of only two classes; the bourgeoisie who are wealthy, are rulers, and control 
the means of production and the proletariat who are poorer, are ruled and are without any means 
of production. The latter works for the enrichment of the former (Marx & Engels, 1973). Weber 
claimed inequality is more complex than this. In contradiction to Marx’s position, the possession 
of power and influence can also originate from other conditions than from just economic terms. 
According to Weber three factors can account for inequality in societies; class, status and 
party/political power. Class denotes the individual’s wealth and economic standing in a society. 
Status denotes the individual’s prestige, honor and the general respect given to an individual. 
Party/political power denotes the political rank or position of an individual within an 
organization. Further, these organizations tend to fight for their own interests whilst disregarding 
others who are not affiliates to their group (Bendix, 1974). Inequality can thus come through the 
facts that others have more wealth than others and thus can consume more power; others may be 
regarded as more respectful like priests or poets and thus get afforded more power and lastly; 
others may have higher rankings in organizations such as political parties, unions or professional 
associations and therefore can exercise more power or influence over others and affiliates to 
these organizations may hone more power than non-affiliates.  In contrast to Marx’s two classes 
system. Weber claimed there are four central classes; the upper class (property owners), the 
white-collar workers/commercial class (intellectuals), the petite bourgeoisie (owners of small 
businesses), and manual working class (Weber, 1946 cited in Gert & Mills, 1961). 
2.3 The Weberian theory of the state and exercise of legitimate power/control within this state 
Weber maintained that all political power seeks legitimacy. Therefore, control by the state ought 
to be a product of a legitimate process.  There are accordingly three means that this legitimate 
control can be ensured. It can be ensured through charismatic domination, traditional domination 
or through legal-rational domination (Parkin, 2002). Charismatic domination can be 
characterized by familial or religious inclinations. It occurs when a leader distinctively relies on 
his charm and appealing abilities to convince the masses to follow him owing to the benefits he 
can attain and provide for them through his extra ordinary powers. The masses obedience is not 
informed by tradition, statute or legal principles but by the leader’s personality, unusual qualities 
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and capabilities that inspire them. Whether the charismatic leader does indeed possess power and 
strength to attain what is promised is insignificant if it remains true that the followers believe that 
such power and capabilities do exist. This form of domination can be used by people such as a 
religious leader, a powerful demagogue, a political party leader or a warlord (ibid). Traditional 
domination can be characterized by patrimonalism or feudalism. In this case, legitimacy is 
derived from tradition or custom. Authority to govern is thus passed down often through 
hereditary and does not change over time. Authority held by a leader or a family is not 
challenged by the governed for they consider the system to be the manner in which their society 
has always been governed and because there exists a deep reverence for old traditional beliefs 
and practices. Legal-rational domination is characterized by rational statutes and the 
bureaucracy.  Legitimacy is derived from an enacted law and other agreed upon legal principles. 
Authority is exercised by a person or an institution as a result of and through the legal office that 
they hold. Obedience by the followers is to the office and not the individual/leader. Leaders are 
appointed or elected into their respective positions through a process. Once they leave these 
positions, their authority ceases; it remains rooted in the office as opposed to the individual. The 
fundamental feature of this domination is the rationally enacted set of rules. This is important for 
with a rationally developed legal system comes a high possibility of guaranteeing a rationally 
developed political system. These systems are important since they provide structure and routine 
to authority. Linked with this are ordered elections, constitutions, established offices, regularized 
modes of representation, political procedures, security forces (Giddens, 1971) and other well 
developed set of rules.  
Weber held these three forms of domination or types of authority to be hierarchical in nature. In 
this view, societies will progress from charismatic domination to traditional domination and 
finally develop to legal-rational domination which is what characterizes the modern state. In the 
modern state, this domination or authority is exercised by the bureaucracy. Legitimacy does not 
however come from the bureaucratic officials themselves but from legal rationality, legal order 
and enacted laws/statutes. The society accepts the legality of the rules that the bureaucracy 
applies when governing them. Weber’s conception of the bureaucratic officials is a set of 
individuals who are appointed on basis of conduct and their technical qualifications. These are 
qualified individuals appointed to perform impartially attributed responsibilities of the state and 
are in turn paid a salary for their work (Weber, 1958). Owing to the capacity of the bureaucracy, 
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Weber considered the legal-rational authority to be the most efficient and rational form of state. 
Traditional authority always faces vulnerability and inevitably crises when the territorial 
jurisdiction of the patriarch increases. Overwhelmed by the increased duties of the increased 
territory, the patriarch will delegate administration responsibilities to his dependents. These 
dependents are always inclined to try to formalize and codify their privileges and entitlements. 
Characteristically, the patriarch will resist these more formally inscribed rules as they will reduce 
his latitude of purely unrestricted and arbitrary powers.  This is typical in traditional authority 
because patriarchs are willing to abide by custom but not conform to laws (Weber, 1958). 
Another shortfall of this authority is that it creates and preserves inequalities (ibid). Charismatic 
authority is also predisposed to its own shortfalls. Firstly, it lacks all forms of established 
organization. It is also challenging for a charismatic leader to retain his authority since his 
followers must continue to validate or legitimize it. This can be easy during periods of unrest 
where the leader’s gifts and extraordinary powers are viewed to be relevant and required to 
resolve a problem (Parkin, 2002). Once this unrest ends, the leader’s popularity begins to 
decline. When eventually the leader dies or his charisma is lost, charismatic authority will 
convert into either traditional or legal-rational authority (Weber, 1958). 
Contrary to the mentioned shortfalls of charismatic and traditional authorities, legal rational 
authority is based on impartiality and on intellectual rationality of one objective law which 
governs all. Unlike in traditional authority where personal considerations, personal connections, 
favors, and privileges play part, the bureaucracy governing through legal rational conduct their 
responsibilities without friendship or favors to any individuals (Weber, 1958). The assurance of a 
bureaucratic authority is its impartiality. Its officials act without prejudice or passion. They apply 
the same set of rules to all, irrespective of existing differences of social ranks and conditions. 
Elucidating on this system, Parkin (2002) explained that bureaucracy is a system of laws and not 
a system of people. The state uses the police and the military as its main instruments of 
legitimate force/violence. Private force can also be used but it ought to derive its legitimacy from 
the state. In this view, the state is regarded as a structure of command and obedience. In the 
character of the state, attention is directed away from individual actors and their perceptions. It is 
instead drawn to legal principles and robust institutions which will ensure these legal statutes and 
principles are adhered to. The bureaucratic system presented by Weber takes no heed of personal 
volition, sentiments or feelings. It is a dehumanized system which is purely about formalized and 
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inflexible set of rules and their adherence. It is a calculated and rational system affording no 
space to humans who have the capacity of being irrational.  
Concerning the economy, Weber believed that the state’s role in economic growth is largely 
delineated by the provision of collective goods; the goods being the services provided by the 
bureaucracy. These can include necessary infrastructure, regulation of business and aid or 
impediments to entering an industry (Gerth & Mills, 1958; Parsons, 1964; Stinchcombe, 1974). 
Weber (1968) believed that the bureaucracy can be organized in a manner that encourages 
economic growth. In an attempt to prove these claims true; a research was conducted by Peter 
Evans and James Rauch in 1999. They used two of Weber’s bureaucratic principles, meritocratic 
recruitment and career appeal and concluded that indeed the Weberian bureaucracy can yield 
economic growth. Meritocratic recruitment refers to the competence based selection of 
employees as opposed to selection based on connections. If the state employs capable and 
intelligent people, the state is more likely to be run efficiently. Contrast to this; if it employs 
people using patronage or nepotism, it is likely to produce corruption and hostility. Career appeal 
refers to the desirability of elements such as the possibility for progression, the length of 
employment term, and base salary. A foreseeable career progression in a long term employment 
can reduce the attractiveness of quick gains emanating from corrupt individual practices (Gerth 
& Mills, 1958; Parsons, 1964; Stinchcombe, 1974). Collectively, these features affect the 
proficiency, predictability, and the general efficiency of the state bureaucracy. Private enterprises 
want to invest in a predictable environment and under a reasonable and understandable 
bureaucratic environment. Consequently, these factors must have a practically direct impact on 
private investment which in turn will affect the rates of economic growth (Evans & Rauch, 
1999). An effective bureaucracy is consequently a foundation for economic growth. To support 
this claim, it is held that the successes experienced by the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) in positively transforming their political and economic spheres 
was achieved through a well-functioning, strong and centralized administrative bureaucracy 
(Amsden, 1989; Im & Park, 2010; Wade, 1990; World Bank 1993). 
2.4 Reasons for state failure 
Most of the scholars in the state failure theory discourse agree with and endorse Weber’s 
definition and understanding of the state. States fail when they lose their legitimacy owing to 
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their lack of ability to control their territories and perform basic functions (Dorff, 1999). 
Economically, failure begins when states can no longer regulate their economies and 
consequently, living standards decline rapidly. This economic reason is propelled by the 
advocates of economic liberalism like the World Bank, who after unsatisfactory outcomes of 
Structural Adjustments, now argue that hindrances to growth in the third world are due to the 
deficiency or lack of stronger states, operational institutions and improved government 
performance.  Politically, state failure begins when leaders undermine democratic norms, coerce 
the legislature, the bureaucracy and the judiciary and ultimately control over the security and 
defense forces is taken over by private individuals. This political motive is propelled by western 
countries owing to the emergence of international terrorism; in particular post the 11 September 
2001 (a day that has since been commonly referred to as 9/11) attacks on the United States’ (US) 
prominent government and military buildings. When these political and economic aspects 
converge, the state’s provision of services keeps decreasing. The people subsequently begin to 
protest, loyalty to the state decreases, people shift their loyalties to communal warlords, and 
mobilization in line with language, religion and ethnicity escalates. Conflict between the 
government and groups who see a possibility of taking over from the failing government 
inevitably erupts. Following this, the state’s power and its legitimacy recedes; it loses control 
over some of its territory to belligerents and anarchy sets in (Rotberg, 2002). Consistent with 
Weber’s understanding which equated the lack of the monopoly of force by the state to anarchy 
are proponents of state failure’s  reasoning; when the state loses its monopoly of force, when 
other factions of the society have this power as well, anarchy sets in. The provision of security or 
other services which are deemed as belonging to the state by other entities other than the state 
reveals failure on part of the state. This is because the state is seen as devoid of other entities in 
the society. The Weberian state owes its essence to the exclusive use of legitimate force. 
Accordingly when the state no longer has this monopoly, it is failing.  
A failed state is by definition a contrast of what a strong state is. Strong states can govern over 
their territories and provide a considerable order of political goods to their citizens. Strong states 
ensure political freedom, ensure good environments for economic growth and render notable 
levels of security from violence emanating from political or criminal activities. They are 
territories free of disturbances, where rules, regulations and order thrive. (Rotberg, 2002). The 
possibility that these factors may vary considerably between different systems in not heeded to. 
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If a state fails to imitate or embody the Weberian model of a state, it is failing and inescapably 
requires external assistance to put it right.  
2.5 The spectrum of failed state 
There exists no one clear definition of what state failure really is. Definitions have consequently 
involved a number of situations where the environment in question is in conflict or in some form 
of turmoil. In the lack of a single precise definition; a range of categories has been described to 
explain failure. States can either be weak, fragile, failing, failed or collapsed. Although these 
various situations may signal that there may be a need for differences in approaches to fixing 
these malfunctioning states or rebuilding them in cases of state collapse; intervention 
programmes have always concentrated on the inadequacy or lack of structured and functional 
state institutions which are regarded as the principal holdup to the quest of security, peace and 
development. Lambach (2004) has argued that there exists no precise threshold for state failure. 
He instead differentiates between weak states which may still be able to offer limited political 
goods, and collapsed states which no longer have working governing institutions and therefore 
cannot offer even an ounce of order. Weak and fragile states depict similar conditions. They can 
still provide a certain amount of the necessary political goods but not all of them, control of the 
state is contested and conflicts are endemic. Failing states are those that get overwhelmed by 
internal violence. The complete intensity of violence does not however denote what a failed state 
is. Its definition lies in the persistent character of that absolute violence (Carment, 2003; 
Rotberg, 2002). If a state fails to use physical force to contain or defeat the insurgency, it is a 
failing state. It is failing to utilize the essence of its existence, its monopoly of violence to control 
and contain its citizenry.  
Failure can be due to a range of factors which can also be used as indicators of this failure. These 
are flawed institutions, demolishing democratic debate, a weak judiciary, deteriorating or 
destroyed infrastructure, deteriorating education and health care services, increased inequality 
between the rich and the poor, the rise of infant mortality, conflicts, decreasing actual national 
and per capita levels of gross domestic product (GDP) and the AIDS epidemic that overwhelms 
health infrastructure (Rotberg, 2002). The description basically contains virtually all the 
challenges being experienced by third world countries habitually due to their colonial history 
(which state failure theory does not account for). Failure is thus intended to delineate particular 
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set of situations and to omit states that bear only a few of the conditions of failure.  This criterion 
is designed by a number of questions to be answered to determine if a state is failing or not. 
Questions cited by Rotberg (2002) are how really nominal are the infrastructure, schools, 
hospitals and clinics? How less has the GDP decreased? How has the infant mortality risen? 
“How far does the influence of the central government reach? How little legitimacy remains? 
Most important yet, because civil conflict is held to be decisive for state failure, can the state still 
provide security to its citizens and to what extent?” (Rotberg, 2002:11). 
Both failing and failed states do not have control in some of their territories, suggesting a lack of 
capacity to halt internal threats of a rebellion or terrorism. Failing states are those that greatly fail 
their citizens and or are not able to attain economic growth (Bates, 2008). The environment of 
failed states is constantly tense and full of hostilities. In most of them, the government troop’s 
battle armed insurgency. Failure appears when violence escalates into a thorough internal war, 
when the ordinary infrastructure deteriorates and the leaders’ greediness causes them to neglect 
their responsibilities to the people (Rotberg, 2002). The extreme case of state failure which is 
state collapse occurs when the state fails to perform its basic functions as a state. It is a condition 
where “structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart” 
(Zartman, 1995, p. 1) and need to be reconstructed through identified relevant means. Collapsed 
states have no constituted governments and thus no governance. They are marked by the 
breakdown of the central government authority to enforce order. This results in the loss of both 
tangible territorial control and the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. The crucial point here 
is the state’s inability to reproduce the conditions for its own existence (Brown et al., 2010). The 
postulation is that states legitimately exist when they can not only exert but also reproduce their 
monopoly of power to properly and continuously govern and provide security to their citizenry. 
Since they exist to provide certain governmental needs, when they cannot guarantee an 
environment to carry out these duties, they are failing. 
In Africa state collapse ensued in two waves. The first occurred towards the end of the second 
decade of independence, when administrations that had succeeded the initial nationalist 
generation were toppled, taking the entire state formation with them into an empty space or 
vacuum. In support of this claim, Zartman (1995) exemplifies with the Chad war of 1980-1982, 
where a war erupted between guerrilla victors and a previous regime which completely destroyed 
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all arms of government and left empty or vacuumed spaces in the society. The second wave 
came when authoritative successors of the nationalist group were ousted by new successor 
regimes that could only abolish but not replace a functioning government (ibid). During this time 
(1979-1982), Chad was governed through an alliance of armed groups called the Transitional 
Government of National Unity (GUNT). GUNT’s rule was however nominal due to 
fragmentation that characterized Chad since its independence. Worsening challenges faced by 
GUNT was the ongoing civil war that had erupted in 1965 (Lemarchand, 1986). Furthermore, 
divisions between the Islamic central and northern regions and the colonially exploited south 
regions were still prevalent. GUNT suffered intense internal rivalries and external interventions 
from Libya, France, Nigeria and Sudan respectively also compounded the problem 
(Nolutshungu, 1996). It is held that weakness, poor state capacity and the lack of a well-
established bureaucracy to control rebellion rendered the GUNT incapable of ensuring peace, 
providing security and controlling insurgents (Fearon & Laitin, 2007). The state was ill equipped 
to govern the whole country; it did not have the necessary capacity to regulate and implement 
policies in regions outside the capital, especially the north region of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibetsi 
(BET) which from colonial times was used to self-governing for the French had always left it to 
its own rules and regulations (May, 1983). As a result, half of the country fell under the control 
of insurgents whilst GUNT’s control got reduced to the capital, N'Djamena 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Chad2010.pdf). Triaud (1985:20) argued that “the central 
problem confronting Chad since 1960 is not so much the north-south opposition, an important 
pulsation among others, as it is the construction of a modem state; for a number of historical 
reasons this process has aborted”. Seen in this light, states fail when governments fail to assert 
their authority and perform what is mandatory and prescribed of them. Consequently, rescuing 
this state would mean reaffirming the government structure and its authority. As to other key 
players that might be performing these prescribed governmental roles and consequently closing 
the vacuum, they are unheeded. This view or its lack thereof is further entrenched by state failure 
proponents’ outlook and connection of institutional breakdown to societal breakdown. There 
exists an unyielding view that there are functions and services that can only be rendered by the 
government. Consequently, when the government can no longer accomplish this, the society will 
break down for anarchy will thrive owing to a void created by the government which no other 




2.6 Failed state in Africa 
State failure proponents disregard the role of any external forces, and importantly history, have 
played in the final product of what constitute to a state. They hold that state failure is man-made 
and therefore cannot be attributed to merely accidental, geographical, environmental or external 
factors. It is instead a consequence of poor leadership decisions and leadership failures (Rotberg, 
2004). The description of the state failure is sanctioned such that it rules out possibilities of 
failure coming from external forces. The main forces of failure are to be found only inside a 
given state. Failure can be due to corrupt leaders, the absence of political will, the absence of 
proficient institutions, lack of democratic practices or lack of economic development and 
effective economic policies which cultivates the economy. It can also be as a result of nationalist 
and later generation regimes that took over established and well-functioning states and ran them 
to the ground (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2004).  
Applied in general, there are a number of misconceptions, flaws and inadequate descriptions in 
the regard of failure as a consequence of solely internal factors. In Africa, it entails the disregard 
of the long history of colonialism in the continent and thereby discount the impact colonial 
legacies have in contemporary African states.  Jones (2008) has argued that the current condition 
and challenges faced by many contemporary African states ought to be located in the history of 
colonialism and global capitalism. This is due to the fact that contemporary African states are a 
residue of colonial administrative entities which were designed to be apparatuses of exploitation, 
oppression and domination (ibid). A description devoid of this history is thus insufficient and 
unfair as it places culpability on Africans for the difficulties the continent is experiencing whose 
roots can be traced back to colonialism. The inseparable link with colonialism and its critical 
effects to contemporary African states cannot be over-stressed. It has shaped the social, political 
and economic realities of Africa (Diop, 2012). This colonization was profit driven and excluded 
any democratic system of governing. It was used to take Africa’s raw resources using African 
cheap labor to increase financial gain.  Owing to this purpose of colonialism; it necessarily had 
to be undemocratic, autocratic and involve the abuse and mistreating of the colonized/subjects. 
Colonial structures and systems were detrimental to African prosperity, inheriting and maintain 
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them post-independence as African leaders did, meant continuing and sustaining the detrimental 
effects they had on Africa. 
Through colonialism, African state’s economies were intentionally designed to rely on Europe. 
The production of raw materials or goods was entrenched. Established industries were not 
equipped to process these resources but were designed to export them to Europe. Europe would 
then process it and sell the final product back to Africa at steep prices for profit. African 
economies have since continued to be financially and technologically dependent on the west 
(Ake, 1981). Another enduring legacy stems from the haphazard partitioning or the demarcation 
of territorial boundaries in Africa, which was done without consultation with the inhabitants. 
This partitioning resulted in the separation of some kins, forcing them to live in different states 
although being of common ancestry. This has caused perpetual contentions between 
heterogeneous groups (Ndege, 2009). It has also increased rebellion and decreased government 
legitimacy when rebels seek to rejoin with their kins in neighboring states and do not recognize 
the government in states where they were apportioned into. This means the control the 
government had over this sect decreases as they rebel. This further entrenches the concept of 
African state failure as an important measure of state failure is how much geographical territory 
the government genuinely controls. It is argued that failed states cannot govern or regulate their 
borders; they also lose large segments of their territories with their power regularly restricted to 
the capital city and one or a few other ethnically specific zones. The territories where the 
government has no control over may be controlled by insurgence or rebels who are contesting 
the government (Newman, 2009). Another pointer of state failure is the increase of criminal 
violence. When the state cannot control other territories, its power starts to weaken and it begins 
to utilize criminal oppression to manage the citizenry. General lawlessness thrives; gangs and 
criminal groups become more widespread and end up ruling the streets of the cities. Anarchy 
becomes a norm and to get protection people look to warlords and other prominent figures who 
express ethnic or clan unity (Klein et al., 2002). An example of this would be the Darfur region 
of Sudan where the government could not control the entire country allowing this region to be 
controlled by rebel groups (Bates, 2007).  
The conferring of failure to Africa is done biasedly. For an example, the US Civil War which 
occurred 100 years after their professed revolutionary war and Independence has never been 
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referred to as failure but regarded as an important juncture in the development of the 
contemporary US state. Similarly, during the French Revolution, France was in a constant state 
of chaos and disorder, disorder and civil conflict; yet this period has never been considered to be 
an instance of state failure but regarded an important period in the emergence of the modern 
French state (Wai, 2012). By contrast, African state’s independence is on average 55 years this 
year, which is nearly half the period it took for both US and France to constitute their individual 
states, but they are already theorized as failed state (ibid).   
2.7 Failed states and their link to terrorism 
One cannot expound on the concept of state failure devoid of the fatal 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Although the concept is not new, it nonetheless gained more momentum post these 9/11 attacks.  
The US foreign policy transformed and more resources were dedicated into deterring future 
terrorists’ attacks, initiatives and partnerships were called for to counter terrorism and a declared 
mission to combat terrorism termed the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was set to motion. Failed 
states were held to be offering places of protection, operation and spaces to raise funds for 
terrorists groups. This is because failed states are not able to control parts or all of their 
territories. This creates vacuums which make it easy for terrorists groups to operate undetected in 
these unwatched territories/vacuums (Milliken, 2003). Examples of these are states like 
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Somalia who leave 
portions of their territories governmentally empty through their incapability to exert power and 
establish authority within their countries (Rotberg, 2002).  
Since failed states lack control in some or all parts of their countries; their boarders are usually 
the key areas where this lack of control most occurs. These porous borders subsequently become 
breeding grounds for a number of illegal practices. These practices include illegal arms trade, 
drugs trade, human trafficking, prostitution, customs and tax evasion, smuggling of goods and 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. Out of this range of illicit practices, a number of other 
authors have considered failing and failed states as proving safe havens for terrorist groups. 
Thus, these states are posing threats to the international community because their problems are 
likely to spill across their boarders (Carment, 2003; Crocker, 2003; Diamond, 2002; Fukuyama, 
2004; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Kahler, 2002; Mallaby, 2002; Rotberg, 2002; Sanderson, 2004; 
Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002).  
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Terrorist groups thrive in failed or failing states primarily because they are easily penetrated into 
and have inept and untrustworthy law enforcement capabilities. Failed or failing states lack the 
ability to police their entire territory. All these conditions grant terrorists leeway to assemble, 
generate income, train, recruit and establish communication mediums above those possible in 
non-failed states (Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002). This situation can be regarded as the exploitation 
of ‘stateless areas’ which is “the use of actual, spatial regions of a country that are beyond the 
policing control of the central government and within which non-state actors can set up 
autonomous political, economic, and social institutions, or the segments of a polity of a country 
that are impenetrable by state power and provide networks of resistance to state authority” 
(Piazza, 2008:471). A larger pool of potential terrorist recruits is also offered by failed states. 
This is because failed states comprise of great numbers of disgruntled, disloyal, insecure and 
marginalized populace in which political strife is an accepted manner of conduct. Through their 
incompetence, failed states foster political goods voids or vacuums which can be utilized by 
terrorist groups and provide personal security, economic support and other services meant to be 
provided by the government in order so as to win the backing of local people and broaden their 
undertakings (ibid).   
Understanding a state in this manner predisposes institutional centered interventions when a state 
is held to have failed or is in the course of failing. Remedies advocated for are consequently 
robust multi or unilateral military interventions and a variety of policies such establishing stable 
or strengthening democratic institutions and increasing economic support (Newman, 2009). 
Countering the threats posed by terrorists subsequently requires cooperation between law 
enforcement and the military instruments of power. The military is to establish protected access 
into the areas where terrorists operate within failed states whilst the law enforcers will identify, 
locate and arrest terrorist suspects from these areas (ibid).  This demonstrates the importance of 
the general security forces in salvaging failed states be it in a form of the military, police or the 
intelligence unit. It is further argued that failed states offer little room for absorbing capacity-
building efforts by external players in the absence of a functioning security sector (ibid), hence 




2.8 Failed states and development 
Not only are failed states a global security threat through their harboring of terrorist groups. They 
also cause many other contemporary problems such as poverty, illicit economic activities, 
refugees, human rights violations, causing conflicts, organized crime, humanitarian emergencies, 
regional instability, and hamper attempts to advance democracy, good governance and economic 
sustainability (Wyler, 2008). This is ensured through the lack of development in weak, failing or 
failed states (Fukuyama, 2004).  
Strong states are able to provide essential governmental services to their citizens. They can 
govern their territories, provide civil and political rights, protection, order, justice, infrastructure, 
and are well developed (Sorens, 1999). The robustness of these states ensures that they can 
govern their entire territories thereby reducing the possibilities of terrorist groups operating in 
their countries undetected. On the contrary, weak states are always underdeveloped states. 
Securing development in weak states will thus progress them into stronger states capacitated to 
control their territories. The assumption is the same as in curbing state failure through the 
strengthening of control and security. It is assumed that development can be imported through 
various mechanisms ranging from importing policies, strategies and enhancing or creating 
institutions which are prone to development. It is argued that sustainable development requires 
definite specific preconditions. Since these preconditions are lacking in weak, failing and failed 
states, there is a need to create them to ensure development; without which development will not 
be forthcoming (ibid).  
Weak, failing and failed states are therefore not only a threat to global security, but are 
furthermore an impediment to sustainable development. The advocates of weak/failed state 
discourse argue that the chief reason for underdevelopment in African countries has been the 
failure of the state. Due to their weakness, these states fall short of delivering basic services, 
maintaining law and order, supporting basic economic functions and raising significant revenues 
to develop their economies. They have a weak rule of law and thus weak justice systems and 
institutions which are fundamental in creating societies that facilitate growth and development 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2012). The economic deficiency in these 
failing states produces a lack of a rational national economy appropriate for the fundamental 
wellbeing of all citizens (Sorens, 1999). In trying to assist Africa’s poor performing economies 
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post-independence; externally recommended economic based initiatives such as the Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (PRSs) were embarked on by many African states during the 1980s through 
to the 1990s. The rationale was that strong economic growth will trickle down to benefit all 
segments of the society (Riddell, 1992). Although these policies were meant to generate rapid 
growth and accelerate development, it was recognized that they produced negative impacts for 
the poor. They failed to integrate environmental and social concerns which worsened poverty, 
inequalities and environmental degradation. It was therefore concluded that guaranteeing 
sustainable development would entail using a holistic approach which not only concentrates on 
economic factors but social and environmental concerns as well. The view that 
compartmentalized social, economic and environmental factors was discarded for a position that 
acknowledged the interactions and interlinks between the economic, social and environmental 
factors of sustainable development (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2012). 
Regardless of this change in rationale and policy instruments; the significance of state 
institutions is still prevalent, reasonably so given that the state (or its weakness) is still regarded 
as the chief culprit for underdevelopment in Africa. It is held that institutional sustainability is an 
imperative for achieving sustainable development in Africa. The linking and construction of a 
holistic approach to sustainable development still need to be done within an environment of well-
defined and responsive institutional framework. Although a number of African states have made 
good progress in incorporating environmental issues in their development plans and strategies, 
the institutional and legal frameworks for environmental management are still insufficient 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2012). Interventions to remedy this include 
the establishment of institutional capacity for proper monitoring and evaluation of policies, 
stimulating political will which includes good governance and reconstructing the economy. The 
reinforcement of the institutions of democratic governance will increase participation which in 
turn will warrant transparency and accountability. Reconstructing the economy is meant to 
revive the foundations of economic development and includes refurbishing the infrastructure, 
roads, schools and the general public structures (Di John, 2008). Important to note in this holistic 
approach is that there is a link between security, peace, state capacity and economic 
reconstruction (Zoellick, 2009). Sustainable development flourishes best in a setting of good 
governance, peace and security. Africa’s paramount development requirement is consequently 
the preservation of an environment of peace and security. In Africa’s weak, failing and failed 
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states; this necessitate that peace building, state building and economic reconstruction ought to 
occur first before any true quest to development can begin. The state building process enhances 
institutional capacity and the state’s legitimacy. It ensures the development of an effective 
government that is founded on law and generally agreed upon legal codes. Through this linkage 
of security and development, this model facilitates for a smooth transition from instability to 
peace and stability and finally sustainable development (United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa, 2012).  
The state is responsible for its own weaknesses and failures. Accordingly, to safeguard 
development, it needs to overcome the challenges that lead to its weakness such as its failure to 
provide security, weak governance, limited administrative capacity and lack of viable 
governmental institutions. It is in this sense that the state still remains important and crucial in 
ensuring development and promoting economic growth. The state is seen as a unitary actor 
capable of strategically assessing its situations and act in accordance with maximizing its 
interests. It is treated as an organic entity and afforded with an ontological status (Migdal, 1994). 
State failure theory treats states as a homogenous entities; a state in one part of the world will 
thus be the same everywhere else. Consequently, the notion of building and importing 
institutions or policies that have strengthened the state in one place is viewed not only as a 
possibility but also as a practical and sensible quest. 
Notwithstanding the realization that the state should not be the engine for growth, its role 
however has evidently not lessened. It is still maintained that the state ought to be a proficient 
and credible facilitator of economic development. It should create enough revenue to attract 
investors to grow the economy and play a guiding and monitoring role in facilitating for the well-
functioning of the market. It is well established government institutions that enable this proper 
functioning of the market, drive and sustain growth in the long term and protect the economy 
against both internal and external shocks (Rodrik, 2006). Other key needs are a legal framework, 
taxation systems and a well-developed infrastructure (Di John, 2008).  Sorens (1999) contends 
that successful development has never occurred deprived of the vital part played by the state in 
this century. He continues to simplify the function or role of the state in development in three 
relevant features; state autonomy, state capacity and statecraft. State autonomy is the amount of 
freedom the state and the bureaucracy have to maneuver and operate within the state. State 
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capacity is concerned with the degree of efficiency of the bureaucracy including the security 
forces and their machineries which ensure order. Statecraft refers to the state’s capability to 
formulate proper policy to address development challenges and promote ones that are 
development responsive (ibid).  
In an effort to assist in the entrenchment of development in Africa and to afford Africans a 
feeling of ownership of strategies and policies that enhance development; organizations such as 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) were established with support from the United Nations as plans for the 
continent to provide conducive environments for peace, security, democracy and good 
governance which are all necessary preconditions for sustainable development 
(http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/development/international.shtml). The underlying rational 
behind this argument is that when performed and aligned correctly, certain policies and 
conditions guarantee development. The argument is that good governance will make democracy 
thrive thereby reducing the opportunities of a conflict. This democracy in turn makes good 
government more possible. This good government ought to subsequently bring about 
institutional consolidation, political consistency and the functioning of the rule of law that is 
generally regarded as the essential framework for investment. With more investment will come 
economic growth which provides the bases for development (Chabal, 2002).  
Highlighting the difficulty to achieve sustainable growth in weak and failing states; the World 
Bank has detailed that virtually all states identified as fragile in the 1980s are still fragile today 
(World Bank, 2006). Due to the rigid notion of the Weberian state; non-compliance to it is seen 
as a negative and as failure. The state is seen as a structure of command, it is understood as a 
policing force that watches, regulates and controls the society as opposed to a force that is in 
interaction with the society. This understanding allows for no other characterization of the state. 
The World Bank’s findings may be displaying that the so called fragile states represent a 
different kind of statehood than the classical Weberian state. To have maintained the so called 
weakness or fragility for so many years may be an indication that whatever conditions are 




2.9 State in society approach 
Contrasting the Weberian concept of the state advocated by the state failure proponents is what 
Migdal (1994) coined the ‘state in society’ view. He considers the Weberian idea of the state to 
overestimate the power and autonomy of the state. The underlying understanding being that the 
state is not a fixed ideological entity but an embodiment of ongoing dynamics. His fundamental 
argument is that the arrangement of domination (or control in state failure terminology) is 
informed by significant struggles that are dispersed in society’s several fields of domination and 
opposition. Officials or bureaucrats operating and interacting at different capacities and levels of 
the state are the key participants in these struggles. In different cases; these struggles my result in 
two types of domination, either into integrated domination or dispersed domination. In integrated 
domination, the state or possibly other social forces establish an extensive power base where 
they acts in a coherent fashion. In dispersed domination, both the state and other social forces are 
unable to achieve extensive domination nationwide and components of the state may be pulled in 
fairly different directions. In this environment stems a recursive relationship between the state 
and society whose interactions are mutually transforming. People get transformed as they 
embrace the symbols or codes of the state, and the state as it embrace symbols or codes of the 
society (ibid). 
The Weberian notion is fixated only on one dimension of the state. It is only concerned with 
institutional composition, codified rules and formidable bureaucracy. The state however cannot 
be regarded to consist of only this. There exists another dimension of the state, which is “the 
formulation and transformation of its goals” (Migdal, 1994:12).  In the process of the state’s 
interactions with several social forces; it does not only battle with but also accommodate 
different moral patterns. The state is but another organization in a given society; as such it also 
has real limits to its power. It is not constant in nature, opposing views from other social forces 
together with absorptions or accommodations of these groups result in modifications in its make-
up. These engagements of the state and other social forces are revealed in the implementation of 
policy (Migda,l 1994). To reveal this engagement with the society, Migdal’s interpretation 
disaggregate the state into four levels, the trenches, the dispersed field offices, the agency’s 
central offices and the commanding heights. In the trenches operates state officials who must 
accomplish state’s instructions directly in societies, examples of such officials include but not 
limited to teachers, police officers, tax collectors and foot soldiers. In the dispersed field offices 
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are officials a notch higher than those in the trenches. These are local and regional bodies that 
revise and establish state policies and directives; they include military and police units, courts 
and legislative bodies. The agency’s central offices act as focal points where the formulation and 
enactment of national policies occurs and where resources for the implementation of these 
policies are directed from. The last level is the commanding height which is at highest point of 
the state. Here reside the top leadership of the state; although they depend on the lower levels for 
daily functioning of the state, they may not entirely identify with these other units of the state. 
These units instead become other pressure points amidst many domestic and international forces 
that seek to influence the state’s top leadership. Granted these patterns; it is clear why states 
scarcely produce a single homogenous response to problems. At different points, the different 
officials of the state experiences different pressures from different forces. These different 
patterns of forces experienced by each component of the state mean these components will have 
dissimilar histories, interests, determination and biases. Consequently, the idea of an overall 
autonomy of the state expressed by state failure proponents is questionable (ibid).  
It is true that it has become impossible to understand the term society devoid of the state.  This 
does not however entail that the state molds the groups that compose the society (such that if the 
state weakens, its weakness will trickle down to society). As held above, outcomes of 
interactions between the state and other social forces are mutually transforming. They seldom 
reveal the intentions and determinations embedded in either.  The struggles and accommodations 
that occur during these interactions can result in four ideal types of outcomes. The first is total 
transformation. Here the state succeeds in coopting or overpowering the social forces into the 
state’s domination or control. The state succeeds in transforming how the people in that setting 
identify themselves. The second is the state’s incorporation of existing social forces. Here the 
state is altered as it accommodates and adapts to specific patterns and forces in that setting. The 
third is the incorporation of the state by existing social forces. Here “the organization and 
symbols of the state’s components are appropriated by the local dominating social forces’’ 
(Migdal, 1994:25) such that the outcome is not what the state leaders had projected. The last is 
the state’s total failure in its attempt at penetration. This occurs when the state fails to engage 
with social forces in a certain local setting which results in little transformative effects on the 
society and vice versa (ibid). In a number of arenas or settings, social forces have reorganized to 
enable themselves to take proper measures against new realities of ambitious states. In places 
28 
 
where these social forces have found or created spaces and mechanisms to sustain or sometimes 
increase their own social and economic power outside the state’s moral composition and rules; 
the character of the society becomes a dispersed domination. Here both the state and the social 
forces have not been able to establish an overall hegemony. “Domination by any one social force 
takes place within an arena or even across a limited number of arenas but does not encompass 
the society as a whole” (Migdal, 1994:27).    
Agreeing with Migdal’s argument are authors such as Azarya & Chazan (1987); Boas (2010); 
Boege et al. (2009); Bokonyi (2013); de Herdt et al. (2012) and Raeymaekers (2005). Although 
different from the west, practical statehood does exist in Africa through traditional institutions. 
This reality is however not recognized by the Weberian definition as it mistakenly equates the 
lack of a central government to anarchy. For an example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), the state administration has greatly withdrawn from the public domain. According to the 
state failure theories using the Weberian definition of a state; the DRC state has failed and is in 
turmoil for it no longer performs its basic state functions. Research conducted in the city of 
Lubumbashi of the DRC however demonstrates functionality (de Herdt et al., 2012).  
Administrative tasks that are ideally deemed to fall in state realms are performed locally, taxes or 
levies and security are all performed and offered outside the central government but are still as 
effective if not better. The education sector particularly is also doing significantly well. This 
domain was traditionally reserved for the state, but is still flourishing without it. This is a 
demonstration of how the provision of public services and goods is maintained and how the 
Congolese state continues to endure and transform itself. Albeit no overall regulatory authority 
oversees the system, books are still provided to schools and teachers still receive their wages (de 
Herdt et al., 2012). Essentially then, the state’s governmental structure whose function is to 
provide public services has been redefined instead of being dissipated. This is as a result of a 
continuous process of negotiation between state and non-state actors of the DRC. It illustrates 
how this negotiated character of statehood in Africa with its power differences between the 
different actors advance through continuous renegotiation. This form of regulation does not and 
cannot produce uniform results. The outcome of such regulation is contingent upon power 
configurations and upon particular situations at particular times (de Herdt et al., 2012). Social 
forces continue assuming control of greater number of services traditionally regarded as 
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functions of the modern state. The absence of government has not meant the absence of 
governance.  
The Weberian analysis of the state is founded on the western liberal statehood and is detached 
from historical realities on the ground in African states. Thus by default, it is unable to capture 
and understand the nature of African statehood.  Contrary to proponents of state failure argument 
which holds that when a state fails, it necessarily leads to the failure of the entire society; whose 
collapse is described as the extended breakdown of social coherence, Raeymaekers (2005) 
explains that where the state has defaulted in service delivery, non-state actors occupy this space 
and provide the required serves. This negates the argument that a vacuum is created when the 
state recedes. Instead of focusing on institutional capacity, Raeymaekers focuses on the state-
society struggles for political control. There exists no clear distinction or hierarchy in these 
struggles, the state itself is an organization within the society and not above it “The implosion of 
state structures is thus understood, not merely as an institutional ‘collapse’ or breakdown, but as 
a culmination point in the struggle, between various forces in society, to establish an integrated 
social control over society” (Raeymaekers, 2005:6). Aligned with Migdal, Raeymaekers (2005) 
also conclude that possible outcomes of these struggles could either be that one force emerges 
dominant and thus extend its power to the entire society or no force is able to dominate which 
yield a dispersed domination and thus fragmented social control. Here the struggle for social 
control is predicted to pass to always lower levels of the society through the reinforcement of 
collective limitations to the benefit of more clan based organizations (ibid). It suffices to argue 
than that whatever the outcome of these struggles become; it cannot be viewed as an 
abnormality, weakness, fragility, failure or collapse, it will simply be a resultant of struggles in a 
social space where social forces are constantly engaging each other in struggles for control of 
their shared social space or territory. 
The discourse of both state failure and development are based on the modern western-style 
Weberian state whose fixation is on institutions. A number of states outside the West do not 
however resemble this model of a state; in which state institutions are not the sole institutions 
that accomplish functions which are regarded as the state’s obligations by the Weberian 
definition of the state (Boege et al., 2009). Moreover, in rural areas, the state habitually has no 
has relevance to many. In these areas, non-state customary institutions with roots to pre-colonial 
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past and have considerable resilience and adaptiveness still have an important role in the 
community’s daily life. Local entities such as indigenous knowledge, customary law, extended 
families, clans, chiefs, village elders, religious leaders, tribes and healers determine everyday 
social realities in populations in these areas.  Furthermore, state institutions are relatively 
infiltrated by these ‘informal’ local social forces and institutions. In such countries, often the 
unparalleled mechanism to make state institutions operational is through the use of traditional 
systems or networks; in this way a condition of “co-existence, overlap and blending emerges” 
(Boege et al., 2009:8). The resultants of such a setting Boege et al. (2009) have termed ‘hybrid 
political orders’, where there is a co-existence of political and social organizations with origins 
in both non-state traditional societal structures and inaugurated state structures. In these hybrid 
political orders, different and competing authority structures and claims to power coincide, 
interact and intertwine, merging western and traditional elements of governance. Here “the state 
has no privileged monopolistic position as the only agency providing security, welfare, and 
representation” (Boege et al., 2009:17), it instead has to share its capacity, legitimacy and 
authority with other institutions (ibid). 
To conclude; there stands stark differences in the characterizations of the African state, what it 
constitutes or ought to constitute of, its functions, struggles and how to overcome these struggles. 
On the one end stand scholars who view and define the state as another entity within societal 
political struggles. The state will thus differ in different contexts owing to different societal 
struggles. This difference does not prove failure, but merely reveals the difference in struggles 
engaged on by different societies on different challenges. On the other end stand proponents of 
state failure who use Weber’s definition of the state. Here the state is an entity that has the 
monopoly of power or force within its jurisdiction (Gert & Mills, 1946). The definition is 
universal, discounting other societal entities that may not have the monopoly of power but still 
perform state functions. The discounting of other forms of states results in these other forms 
being regarded as malfunctioning or failing; the lack of the monopoly of power is equated to 
failure. Weber’s definition captures Western composition of the state but falls short on capturing 
realities of the African state. If it is thus used to describe the African state; African states will be 
viewed as failing for they do not conform to the stipulated definition. To illustrate this further, 
the following chapter will use Somalia as a case study to show how this state has been regarded 
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as a failed state albeit other societal entities fulfilling functions of the state and generally 





















Chapter 3: State failure in Somalia 
3.1 Introduction  
Using Somalia as a case study, this chapter illustrates the misunderstanding of the state in Africa 
embedded in Weber’s definition of the state and how it ought to operate. It also shows how 
conclusions drawn from these misunderstandings have aided to worsen the conflict in Somalia 
instead of providing solutions to the conflict. 
3.2 The composition of the Somali people 
Unlike many other African countries; Somalia consists of only one ethnic group. Although with 
a common culture, language and religion, Somalia has a populace divided by clans and further 
sub clans within these clans. The distinction between these two being that a sub-clan is derived 
from a clan. A clan is larger in size and can be defined as a traditional social unit comprised of 
interrelated or interconnected families. Members or families of this group usually believe and 
claim to have descended from a common or same ancestor. A sub-clan is a branch of a large 
clan. It does not exist on its own but within a larger group, being a clan (Hussein, 2007). In 
Somalia, there are six main clans and then sub clans, which can also branch further into sub-sub 
clans right down to household level. Four of the six closely share cultural ties and language; they 
are the Isaaq, Hawiye, Darod and Dir, collectively referred to as Samaale. These are the larger 
population constituting approximately 75% of ethnic Somalis (Hesse, 2011). The other two are 
the Rahanweyn and Digil, collectively referred to as Digil-Mirifle. They constitute 
approximately 20% of ethnic Somalis. The Samaales are historically nomadic clans and inhabit 
the northern parts of the country whilst the Digil-Marifle are historically sedentary farmers and 
inhabit the southern parts of the country (ibid), this entails that a substantial number of Somalis 
are nomadic or semi nomadic herders. The rest of the minority populace are either fishermen or 
farmers (Lewis et al., 2009). Principally, all Somalis are Sunni Moslems; as a result, Islam and 
its practices are at the center of everyday life. They form the belief system, the culture and even 
the structure for government (ibid). It is consequently not surprising that outlooks, gender roles 
and customs are primarily based or derived from Islamic beliefs in Somalia.  
Comparable to virtually all African settings, family is very important in the Somali communal 
settings. The emphasis of the entire Somali culture is on the family. It is more important than the 
sole person in all levels and aspects of life. This importance of a collective family structure 
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extends to the importance of a collective clan structure (Elmi, 2010). Prior to colonization, 
Somalis organized themselves through a reciprocal social system, using kinship associations, 
unwritten customary law (Heer) and religious laws (Qanoon/Sharia) to manage their political life 
(Samatar, 1994). For order and ensuring recompense where it is due; they have historically 
ordered themselves into communal insurance associations called diya-groups, which translates 
blood wealth (Hesse, 2011). Members of these groups are collectively bound to pay and receive 
damages from other groups. Subsequently, in the event of a committed murder, the perpetrator 
and his entire group are expected to pay the family of the deceased along with the entire group 
that that family belongs to. When compensation is not received, the victims group can in turn 
inflict blood revenge not only on the perpetrator but also on any of the family member and group 
members of the perpetrator (Hesse, 2011). The group does not only share blood money or guilt 
however, members are also bound in other various social areas. The groups have an unwritten or 
informal contractual agreement to support other members of the group and share wealth and 
payment responsibilities as well. During hardships or emergency situations, members have an 
obligation to assist other members in need. This can be done through alms giving, loan sharing, 
giving away animals or through mixed herding. Elders are elected and compensated to represent 
individual groups (Ahmed & Green, 1999).  
From pre-colonial times, the general economic foundations of the Somali society have been and 
are still comparable to those of political state institutions and its practices. This is ensured 
through a kinship that uses a combination of customary law and blood-ties. Order is not only 
maintained at higher levels of groups but is safeguarded at different levels of the society. It 
begins from the family level where each household (the Reer) is led by the eldest male, a 
grandfather or father who at a certain age is expected to have attained a substantial measure of 
competence in local culture, values and history and can thus maintain order and teach acceptable 
behavior in his household. The society lives communally abiding to certain unwritten rules and 
regulations to ensure fairness and order. These include Miilo, which is a fixed, and transparent 
practice used to warrant a fair distribution of a valuable resource, water, agreements and 
arrangements on access to planting and grazing pasture, and mutual claim on one another’s 
labors (Hoehne, 2009).  
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3.3 Colonization and independence (1800s-1960s) 
Similar to the fate of virtually all African countries, Somalia was a colony since the mid1800s till 
1960 when it’s gained its independence. Unlike other African colonies however, who had one 
colonial master; ill-fatedly for Somalia, it was colonized by three different powers, namely, 
France, Britain and Italy. This was profit-orientated occupation for each power was motivated to 
secure and safe guard the route to India through the Suez Canal (Roth, 2004). France controlled 
the northernmost region (present day Djibouti) whilst Britain controlled the north naming it 
British Somaliland (present day Somaliland). Finally, Italy controlled the south naming it Italian 
Somaliland (Lewis et al., 2009). Other fellow African states also had control over some parts of 
Somalia; Ethiopia controlled the region of Ogaden which post World War II legitimately fell 
back to Somalia’s control through a United Nation’s (UN) arbitrated agreement in 1948. To date 
however, this region is still contested by these two countries. Due to the contentions within 
Somalia however, the region is still controlled by Ethiopia albeit the fact that a number of 
Somalis believe it ought to be reunited with the larger Somalia. Lastly, to the west, neighboring 
Kenya controlled Somali areas that boarded with its northern most parts (ibid). 
In 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland peacefully gained independence from their 
respective colonizers. Together, they subsequently forged the current boarders that Somalia has 
and formed a unitary state. In 1977, Djibouti also attained its independence from France. 
Although keeping close ties with Somalia, it nonetheless opted to be an independent state from 
the larger Somalia (Roth, 2004). Shortly after their independence in 1960, the Somali civilian 
government allied its state with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), predominantly 
as a mechanism to distance itself from its former European colonizers. As has been recognized to 
be the case in almost all post-colonial Africa, Somalia’s successive ruling class or governments 
were not well trained to cater for their societies’ needs. Compounding the situation was the 
inheriting of the colonial systems and administration that were fundamentally created to cater 
only for a few elite whilst manipulating the masses so as to maximize profits. Similar to the 
colonial years, there were no true attempts to transform, alter or develop basic infrastructure for 
the gains of the entire populace. Many resources were instead spent on improving the 
bureaucratic administration and military capacity which was often used to curb dissatisfied and 
general populace who would not cooperate with the current government (Ahmed, 1995). 
Compounding the problem was that more clansmen from Samaale took strategic and better 
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positions than the clansmen from the Digil-Mirifle, this has sometimes been attributed to the fact 
that the British offered their northern colony a higher standard of education than that offered by 
their Italian counterparts to their southern colony. From independence therefore, centers of 
government and consequently authority came to be associated more with clans than with the state 
(Hesse, 2011). 
Still similar to the rest of post-colonial Africa belief, having waited for independence for a 
lengthy period, Somalis believed that independence would bring about quick changes, quick 
improvements and quick better lifestyles and flourishing futures. When this did not materialize 
quickly, the populace began pronouncing their dissatisfactions and frustrations. The situation 
intensified in 1969 when President Shermaarke was assassinated. Debates in parliament over 
who will succeed him were all futile. Contentions consequently continued and in mid-1969, a 
combined force of Somalia’s military and police staged a coup led by General Mohammed Siad 
Barre. This combined security force placed the constitution aside, prohibited political parties and 
dissolved all the three branches of government, the executive, parliament and the judiciary. It 
established a decision making body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) which was 
meant to rid Somalia of all its quandaries (Samatar & Laitin, 1987). The SRC comprised of 24 
high ranking military and police officials and held positions in key and strategic government 
ministries, namely, Department of Defense, Information and National Guidance and Internal 
Affairs (Farah, 2001). A new military government was fully fledged with General Mohamed 
Siad Barre as its president. Although fundamentally a military government, it rallied and 
recruited a number of qualified civilians to assume ministerial portfolios. This assisted it to gain 
backing, for people appreciated the use of merits as an apparatus to being awarded senior 
positions. Its pronouncement of socialist and nationalist ideals together with its emphasis on self-
reliance and declared war against tribalism also assisted the SRC’s public acclaim enormously 
(ibid). In its early years therefore, this regime enjoyed popular support and cooperation from the 
general public. 
3.4 State failure in Somalia 
As years passed, General Mohammed Siad Barre’s government fell into a trap that its 
predecessors suffered from. The regime became oligarchic and oppressive. With this, support 
from the masses waned and criticisms increased including complaints about Barre’s lack of 
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assertiveness in regaining Ogaden back from Ethiopia. This discontent led to a formation of a 
number of clan-based militias which aimed to oppose and eventually overthrow Barre’s regime. 
As this strife continued, Somalia was still engaged in fighting with Ethiopia over the Ogaden 
region. The USSR then began providing aid to Ethiopia which led President Barre to break off 
all ties with it (Samatar 1994). With this repositioning, the United States (US) which was still 
engaged in a cold war with the USSR saw an opportunity to make Somalia an ally to win it over 
from their enemies, the Soviets (Elmi, 2012). It then began to supply economic and military aid 
to Somalia. When this aid eventually ceased, Barre could no longer maintain ultimate power and 
a complete civil war broke out from 1988 – 1991 resulting in Barre ultimately being exiled in 
1991 (Lewis et al., 2009).  
The year 1991 was a year that initiated a succession of difficulties for Somalia. Various militias 
were formed and competed for the control of the country. Various regions declared unilateral 
independence; namely, the Republic of Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland in the northeast 
and numerous other states in the south also followed suit and declared their autonomy (Hesse, 
2011). Expectedly and as common in any conflicting environment; the recurrent fighting caused 
the infrastructure to break down and the general bureaucratic processes and functions were 
halted. This is when failure began according to the Weberian definition of the state, which 
regards the bureaucracy as the main driver of the state. State failure theorist reason that when 
Barre left, a vacuum appeared (Samatar, 1994); meanwhile there were clan leaders and other 
dissent groups who took control of the capital and were providing public services albeit some 
only to their respective regions (Harper, 2012). Explaining this dire failure Pham (2011) argues 
that Somalia’s state turmoil is no momentary interruption of public institutions; this state cannot 
even be accurately categorized as a failed state for there exists no state that can be referred to as 
having failed. The features from which a state has to be constructed from are non-existent. There 
are no bureaucrats or qualified people who can be used to organize a new government, no system 
for tax collection, no police or army force. These governmental services are instead performed 
by local clan structures devoid of any hierarchical structure or order.  
The state failure theory is a state centered/centric theory. It regards the fundamental reasons of 
state failure or collapse to be found only within a given state, external forces are therefore of no 
significant consequence. As a result, the fact that both the USSR and the US at different 
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junctures funded the Barre regime and thus assisted in guaranteeing its grip to power longer and 
its ability to suppress opposition is unduly not considered. The theory is also ahistorical; failure 
of the state of Somalia is consequently analyzed devoid of its colonial history and the legacies of 
the colonial state. What is held to be an important measure is how much geographical territory 
the government presently controls. Rotberg (2002) notes that Somalia is an exemplary of state 
collapse; it only has boarders but no effective manner to exercise authority within these boarders. 
Since failed states fail to control their borders, they also lose large segments of their territory 
with their power regularly restricted to the capital city and one or a few other ethnically specific 
zones. The territories where the government has no control over may be controlled by insurgence 
or rebels who are contesting the government (ibid). This depiction befitted Somalia whose 
successive attempts of establishing a fully functioning government continuously resulted in a 
unit that could only exercise its powers in the capital of Mogadishu and or in a few other regions.  
It is also maintained that the environment in failed states is constantly tense and full of 
hostilities. In many of them, the government troop’s battle armed insurgency. Failure appears 
when violence escalates into a thorough internal war. When population’s standard of living 
deteriorates, basic infrastructure deteriorates and when the leader’s greediness causes them to 
neglect their responsibilities to the people (Rotberg, 2002). This description also befitted 
Somalia. Due to the continuous fighting, vicinities have been demolished, hospitals overcrowded 
by casualties and an estimated 300 000 of populace from the city have been displaced 
(Mankhaus, 2007). Regarded as another pointer of state failure is the growth of criminal 
violence; when the state cannot control other territories, its power starts to weaken and it begins 
to utilize criminal oppression to manage the citizenry. General lawlessness thrives; gangs and 
criminal groups become more widespread and end up ruling the streets of the cities. Anarchy 
becomes a norm and to get protection people submit to warlords and other prominent figures 
who express ethnic or clan unity (Klein et al., 2002). In the absence of a state police force in 
Somalia, this depiction of failure has occurred as clan based militias have taken over the security 
service and guard over their kin territories and in some regions get remuneration for these 
services (Elmi, 2010). 
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3.5 Interventions to halt failure and resuscitate the state 
On June 2015, the Washington DC based non-governmental organization, the Fund for Peace 
and the Foreign Policy Group published their eleventh annual Fragile States Index (FSI) placing 
Somalia on number two of this list. Before 2014, Somalia had occupied the number one spot on 
the list for six consecutive years. It is now however displaced from being the most failed state in 
the world by the youngest state in Africa, South Sudan (http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/). Being 
declared a failed state necessitates interventions to rectify and undo the alleged failure. In a quest 
to end the alleged failure in Somalia; numerous peace talks were held in which a number of 
transitional regimes were formed but never succeeded in bringing back order. The talks held in 
Arta, Djibouti cumulated in the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG). The 
TNG was however dominated by Mogadishu-based clans (a faction called the Mogadishu Group) 
specifically the Hawiye and the Gedir/Ayr sub clans and thus failed to serve as a foundation for 
an administration of national unity. It consequently was challenged by an alliance of clan 
factions called the Somali Reconciliation and Rehabilitation Council (SRRC) headed by 
Abdullahi Yusuf, president of the northeast state of Puntland who was supported by the 
Ethiopian government (Hessse, 2011). Blatant differences existed between the SRRC and the 
Mogadishu Group. The SRRC was supported by Ethiopia, dominated by families of the Darood 
clan family, strictly anti-Islamic, federalist and mostly based in regions outside Mogadishu. The 
Mogadishu Group was backed by the Arab world, strikingly anti-Ethiopian, comprised of 
Islamists and their allies, dominated by families from the Hawiye clan family and adopted an 
idea of a strong central government as opposed to a decentralized federal  state (Menkhaus, 
2007). 
Owing to the challenges of the Mogadishu Group dominating the TNG, another set of peace talks 
began in Kenya in 2002. These were under the sponsorship of the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD). They culminated in October 2004 with a Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) (Hoehne, 2009). Parliament was elected in a manner that ensured that all the 
four major Somali clans were equally represented. The transitional parliament’s election of a 
president saw the victory of Abdullahi Yusuf (an ally of Ethiopia and a Darood clan member) as 
president of the transitional government. Allegations however arose that Ethiopia had purchased 
parliamentarians’ votes to ensure their ally wins. President Yusuf selected Mohamed Ghedi as 
Prime Minister who was also recognized as a close ally to Ethiopia. Power was concentrated in 
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the hands of Ethiopian-supported SRRC alliance and in the President’s fellow clan leaders. 
Leaders associated with the previous Mogadishu Group, which had previously dominated the 
TNG were noticeably marginalized. What was meant to forge a foundation for national unity was 
once again a base for contention (Hesse, 2011). 
Aware of this marginalization, the Mogadishu Group did not initially dismiss the TFG but 
persistently attended parliamentary sessions in Nairobi, Kenya. Glaring divisions began when 
decisions had to be taken concerning the parliament’s move to the Somali capital of Mogadishu. 
President Yusuf proposed that foreign peacekeepers, including Ethiopia be deployed to 
Mogadishu so as to pacify the capital before the parliament relocate and that in the interim, the 
seat of government be temporary located in an interim capital of Baidoa or Jowhar on the 
reasoning that Mogadishu was still hostile. Both suggestions were rejected by the Mogadishu 
Group who knew of the leverage they had in the capital (Menkhaus, 2007). Consecutively, 
cabinet members from the Mogadishu Group did not attend meetings preventing the transitional 
parliament from reaching a quorum. As a result, parliament did not sit for nearly a year. Fearful 
of moving to Mogadishu, the Yusuf faction of the TFG ultimately moved to the town of Jowhar, 
Somali and then Baidoa respectively (ibid).   
In state failure theory, failure is meant to delineate particular set of situations and to omit states 
that only fulfill only a few of the specified conditions.  This criterion is designed through a 
number of questions to be answered to determine if a state is failing or not. Questions cited are 
“how truly minimal are the infrastructure, schools, hospitals and clinics? How far has the GDP 
fallen and infant mortality risen? How far does the influence of the central government reach? 
How little legitimacy remains? Most important yet, because civil conflict is held to be decisive 
for state failure, can the state still provide security to its citizens and to what extent?” (Rotberg, 
2002:11). Applying these sets of questions to Somalia yields a categorical failure. The TFG did 
not cooperate with each other and consequently could not create a united central force that could 
control the entire territory of Somalia. Following the relocation of the Yusuf wing, the 
Mogadishu Group consolidated its power in the capital through loose coalition with other 
Islamist groups namely shabaab, which translate ‘youth’, and the Supreme Council of Islamic 
Courts (SCIC), which operated under the sharia court umbrella (Menkhaus, 2007). In a quest to 
trap Yusuf’s camp, the Mogadishu Group presented a proposal aimed at improving security and 
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essential municipal administration in the capital swiftly. This was termed the Mogadishu 
Stabilization and Security Plan (MSSP). This MSSP was founded on three pillars: “(i) a pre-
demobilization cantonment of militia; (ii) improvement of public security through a removal of 
militia roadblocks in the city and (iii) the formation of district and municipal councils and 
administration in Mogadishu” (Menkhaus, 2007:366). This proposal meant that Yusuf would 
have to move the TFG to the capital dominated by the Mogadishu Group and expectedly Yusuf 
initially rejected the MSSP (ibid). 
The residents of Mogadishu motivated by the hope that the MSSP would bring real public order 
to the city compelled leaders of the Mogadishu Group to implement it. Businessmen and civil 
society groups offered their support to the initiative and it yielded positive results. With the help 
of civilians, a number of army barricades in and around the capital Mogadishu were removed. A 
Mogadishu city council, main city administrators and city district councils were selected by the 
Mogadishu Group. The security improvements brought by the MSSP were largely due to the 
successful mass mobilization which came to be known as the kadoon or uprising. The kadoon 
took the military by surprise by their steadfast involvement in ensuring the MSSP proposals were 
realized. Women groups were vitalized and constantly sounded militia checkpoints pressing 
militia youths to dismantle barricades. Predominant radio talk shows were congested with visits 
and calls from people voicing their dissatisfaction and stern condemnation of militia leaders and 
others contributing to insecurity in the capital. Fears of this people power and grass-roots 
reaction to the MSSP began in the Mogadishu-Group; they consequently made certain that it was 
neutralized. Many of the achievements achieved through the pressure applied by the society were 
overturned. Militia barricades resurfaced and disbanded militiamen steadily returned to the 
capital (Menkhaus, 2007). Menkhaus further held that it was realistically far-fetched to believe 
that this grass-roots movement could reshape the politics of Somalia for the better (ibid).  
Zartman (1995) maintained that state failure is man-made and therefore cannot be attributed to 
merely accidental, geographical, environmental or external factors. It is instead a consequence of 
poor leadership decisions and leadership failures. This leadership failure in turn causes anarchy 
in the society that has no institutions to regulate and govern over it. Using Zartman’s description; 
Menkhaus (2002) explains how the state of Somalia has failed. He holds that the Mogadishu 
Group’s proposal of the MSSP was never aimed at improving security in the capital. It was 
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instead a strategy to coerce President Yusuf to move the TFG to the capital where the Mogadishu 
Group would have veto power over it and enjoy protection from their Islamist military coalition. 
Notwithstanding the self-regarding interests and failure to put civilian’s interests and security 
first; the Mogadishu residents were not failing along with their leaders. They were able to 
mobilize and pressure the Mogadishu Group to implement the MSSP and moreover assisted 
through protests in reducing instability in the capital by demobilizing militiamen and reducing 
militia roadblocks. Owing to its statist approach; this societal mobilization that can and did 
change the political setting of Somalia during this period is disregarded by the state failure 
theory. Abundant concentration is on the state and its institutions. It is supposed that chaos in the 
state will automatically lead to chaos in the society. The state is seen as the only force governing 
the society and is essentially above it. If then the state in not in order as was the TFG government 
which had Islamists and non-Islamists factions, the society below it will also necessarily not be 
in order. 
3.6 The US’s intrusion in the quest to halt terrorism  
As governments of the supposedly failing and failed states lack control of their entire 
geographical territories; it is argued that this creates vacuums which can be used to harbor 
terrorist groups who in turn pose threats to international security (Milliken, 2003). Since the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the US foreign policy transformed and more resources were dedicated into 
deterring future terrorists’ attacks and this necessitated that the supposedly failing states be 
reconstructed through different types of interventions. That Yusuf and thus the TFG were still 
outside the capital, meant the Islamist through the Mogadishu Group governed the capital. The 
US had long standing concerns about Somalia’s lawlessness that could provide safe haven for 
Al- Qaeda operatives. There was however no functioning central government that the US could 
work with; it consequently decided to forge alliances with non-state actors in its quest to counter 
terrorism. These local allies comprised of businessmen and different militia leaders. Together, 
they formed the US sponsored Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism 
(ARPCT) (Elmi, 2012). Expectedly, this formation alarmed the Islamists who viewed it as a US 
move to target them (International Crises Group 2006). Shortly after this formation, armed 
confrontations between the Islamist militias and the Alliance ensued. The Alliance coalition was 
no match to the Islamists who had the notorious shabbab in their ranks. They had a striking 
42 
 
victory and further expanded their territorial control to a number of regions in south-central 
Somalia (ibid). 
This assisted in further entrenching the Islamist power whilst the TFG power was only limited to 
Puntland in the interim capital of Baidoa and nearby areas. A dispute between the Islamists and 
an important Hawiye military leader over a governing of a municipal administration in 
Mogadishu however erupted. It culminated in a disbandment of the Mogadishu Group and 
control of the capital fell on the hands of another Islamists group identifying themselves as the 
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) (Menkhaus, 2007) others refer to it as the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU) (Hesse, 2011; International Crises Group, 2007; Marchal, 2007).  The CIC consolidated its 
power through its consecutive wins of clashes with local militias and its ability to eliminate any 
potential platform or persons that could oppose it. One of the failures of the CIC cited by 
Menkhaus (2007) was the failure to institutionalize authority with itself. They never created a 
routinized, representative decision-making body. The chief functioning division of the CIC 
remained the sharia courts (of which some of its principles are regarded as undemocratic by the 
western world), which offered rudimentary policing and legal services to the capital and 
surrounding areas. It most powerful branch was however the military which had radical 
influences from the shabaab youth militia (ibid).  
The Courts were nonetheless popular and gained much support from the masses because of their 
ability to offer security and order in the regions they operated in, particularly in the capital, 
Mogadishu. The courts were not necessarily extremists in their operations and orientation. They 
were undoubtedly entirely traditional and completely abode by sharia law. Sentences issued by 
the courts were in accordance with the sharia (Hoehne, 2009). Abiding by the societal clan based 
system, all courts operated within their respective clans and sub-clans. Consequently, a court 
could not arrest offenders or criminals who did not belong to the clan group of the court 
members. In a way, the courts worked as clan institutions (Harper, 2012). Clan and sub-clan 
elders would communicate wishes of their respective clans and all courts had to both abide by 
and respect these specified wishes. They also refrained from getting involved in clan political 
feuds to ensure neutrality (ibid).  
They furthermore helped improve a number of things in Mogadishu as in other various areas 
they had control over. Life of many Somalis was much safer than in previous regimes, there was 
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a reestablishment of peace and security (Harper, 2012). The Mogadishu International Airport and 
harbor were reopened, an achievement that a number of previous transitional governments had 
failed to accomplish. Squatters were removed from government buildings, the illegal seizing of 
land was discontinued, and the numerous claims for the restitution of property were attended to 
through the opening of a number of special courts to deal with the claims (Elmi, 2012). With the 
help of school children and local people, they cleaned streets, brought an end to piracy, 
warlordism and political assassinations.  In general, unarmed clans, the elderly, women, children 
and civilians welcomed and cherished this positive change (ibid). The overall successes of the 
CIC may have been romanticized but they did substantially bring order, security and dramatic 
improvements in the city of Mogadishu (Harper, 2012).  
Alarmed by the successes of the CIC whilst using Islam as a foundation of governing legal codes 
and in part ill advised by Ethiopia, the US held that the CIC was controlled by Al-Qaeda, which 
therefore made fit an intervention to halt terrorism. This announcement occurred on 14 
December 2006, a date that coincided with a visit from the European Commissioner (EC) Louis 
Michel who was in Somalia in a pursuit of mending relations between the fighting opponents 
(Hoehne, 2009). Consequently, whilst the EC perceived a secure and stable environment for 
negotiation, the US saw a terrorist infested environment. This ambiguity did not halt the 
Ethiopian -US war on terror, which was in any case was already underway. The CIC may have 
certainly contributed to the development of this terrorist discourse through some of the union 
leader’s remarks about jihad and their refusal to permit any observers from the international 
community to visit Mogadishu to confirm or refute allegations of Al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia 
(ibid). 
The CIC was overthrown by an invading Ethiopian military backed by the US, which marked the 
beginning of militant Islamism in Somalia. Al Qaeda capitalized on the platform and began its 
electronic jihad campaign in Somalia using the internet and television. It issued a response to the 
Ethiopian military intervention and the general US’s war on terrorism in Somalia by condemning 
the intervention and calling upon devoted jihadists to help the Somali mujahidin (which are 
Muslim guerrilla fighters devoted to jihad/a holy war especially against non-Muslim militias) 
(Hoehne, 2009). The strategy the US used against the CIC only helped create the exact thing it 
intended to destroy. Its misperception of the CIC aided the ascendency of violent Islamism in 
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Somalia. “It might have been more productive if foreign powers had recognized and built upon 
the positive achievements of the UIC” (Harper, 2012:104). They instead destroyed the most 
successful attempt to reestablish order in the central and south regions of the country (ibid). 
3.7 Interventions from International Organizations 
Defeated by the overwhelming Ethiopian forces, the CIC retreated and the Ethiopian military 
occupied the capital uncontested. The TFG subsequently took control of significant government 
buildings with substantial protection from the Ethiopian military. This development was held by 
the international community especially the US as a chance to endorse reconciliation and 
resuscitate a functional central government. The TFG had to meet three conditions to be 
considered as a functioning government. It had to ensure security, reconciliation and show ability 
to govern. These became the foundation of US’s intervention in Somalia during 2007 
(Menkhaus, 2007). The TFG however had no capacity to defend itself in a fiercely hostile capital 
of Mogadishu. Security therefore was of major concern granted Ethiopia’s intention to withdraw 
its forces from Mogadishu speedily. International ambassadors consequently pushed for the 
deployment of an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force termed the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) to Mogadishu to replace the Ethiopian military that was to leave soon. A 
proposal of 8,000 peacekeepers was made and approved by the AU. It was only Uganda however 
who was prepared to send a band of 1,400 soldiers. With the constant and rapid deterioration of 
conditions in Mogadishu, other African states were further motivated to refuse sending their 
troops to Somalia. The Ethiopian military consequently stayed in Mogadishu longer than 
anticipated (ibid). The TFG did not enjoy popularity with the residents of Mogadishu as did the 
Mogadishu Group and the CIC before it. The second condition the TFG had to meet was 
reconciliation. This too it could not achieve, for all factions involved in the conflict took 
positions that guaranteed that no practical progress was achieved in peace dialogues. Leaders 
from the TFG refused to have any negotiations with the Islamists labeling them as extremists. 
The Mogadishu opposition on their part rejected all peace talks until the Ethiopian forces have 
totally vacated the country. It was increasingly becoming impossible to envisage a setting where 
the TFG and its Mogadishu counterparts would engage in earnest peace talks. International 
diplomats still pushed for the realization of the third condition, the capacity to govern. The major 
difficulty was in enhancing TFG’s capacity to afford public security and rule of law in the 
country (ibid). It was easy to predict that the TFG will also fail to meet the last condition of 
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capacity. It was barely capacitated to protect itself in Mogadishu; Ethiopian forces had to stay 
longer to continue providing security to the TFG (ibid). 
The elongated stay of the Ethiopian forces and the unpopularity of the TFG which claimed to 
rule from the capital assured an armed defiance from the inhabitants of Mogadishu. In just two 
weeks of its relocation to Mogadishu, attacks on government buildings occupied by TFG began. 
Ethiopian convoys and military installations were also attacked and vital infrastructure was 
destroyed. The TFG and Ethiopian officials argued that the defiance comprised of Al-Qaeda 
terrorist and their Somali Islamic radical counterparts. They responded to the recurring attacks 
ferociously through a strategy they termed the ‘mopping up’ operation. Whole neighborhoods 
were bombed, resulting in fatalities approximated to surpass 1,000 in the first month of the 
fighting. Between 200 000 and 300 000 people were also displaced (Menkhaus, 2007).  In an 
attempt reasoned to be a tactic to starve the opposition; the TFG halted humanitarian aid into the 
country by imposing a chain of regulatory restrictions. Embarrassed international backers of the 
TFG including the US shifted from quietly expressing their worries to the TFG to publicly 
engaging in diplomatic means to coerce the government on issues of humanitarian admittance 
(ibid). With this reaction, the TFG ticked on almost all the state failure criterion set out by 
Rotberg cited above. It attacked civilians; it had no monopoly of power, could not control the 
entire Somalia territory, had no functioning government institutions and importantly failed to 
provide security for itself and the citizenry it claimed to govern. The resulted substantial loss of 
life, displacement and damage of property and infrastructure are also in line with state failure 
theory. A remedy for this that is in line with the state failure theory is the formation of stronger 
governmental institutions, which will enable government to control its entire jurisdiction. The 
assumed deduction being that, if the TFG had control of its entire territory and had functioning 
institutions, the Mogadishu Islamists’ would have been pacified and attacks would have been 
evaded. 
The European Union’s (EU) involvement in interventions in Somalia was motivated by the 
solidarity they had with the US in countering terrorism. They thus contributed towards the 
interventions as well as the former colonizers of the country, Italy and the United Kingdom 
(UK). Since its establishment in 2007, the EU has contributed EUR 411 million to AMISOM 
through the AU’s African Peace Facility and EUR 4.7 million to assist AMISOM’s planning 
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capacity. It also developed its European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) in 2010 to 
offer training to more than 3 000 militias of the Somalia National Armed Force (SNAF) and 
financed the development and training of the new Somali national police force. During the 
Djibouti peace talks, western governments also agreed on a provision of $213 million to 
establish a strong army consisting of 6 000 men and a police force consisting of 10 000 men 
(Hoehne, 2009).  
3.8 The US’s war on terror and how it aided the rise of extremism in Somalia 
The US used a strategy of identifying and destroying identified targets in Somalia (Elmi, 2010). 
In what they reasoned as a mission to eliminate Al-Qaeda cells, they dropped bombs on to the 
southeastern tip of the country. They closed down Somalia’s leading bank and 
telecommunications company, Al-Barakaat along with its subsidiaries based on allegations that 
the company was the money circulator and quartermasters of terror (Elmi, 2010). Managers of Al 
–Barakaat however denied the allegations and invited the US administration to check its records. 
There were moreover concerns expressed by UN officials in Somalia who cautioned that the 
closure might affect ordinary Somalis. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States’ report also found no evidence linking this company to Al-Qaeda. Despite all 
these, the US retained Al Barakaat in their terrorist list along with Al-Ittihad, al-Islami and Al-
Shabaab (ibid). The International Crisis Group (ICG) warned against the US’s counter-terrorism 
strategy in Somalia. It held that the approach of using unidentified surveillance flights, abducting 
innocent people suspected of being terrorists for elongated periods and cooperating with detested 
faction leaders was entrenching public skepticism and resentment against the US. They 
furthermore warned that the strategy was isolating the Somali people who are vital for the public 
support they can provide in countering terrorism. These concerns were however unheeded (Elmi, 
2010). Through its national Department of Defence (DOD), the US established a Combined Joint 
Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti to facilitate easy executions of the war 
against extremists in the Horn of Africa and Al Qaeda (ibid). 
In cooperation with Ethiopia, the US further hired warlords and their troops, the ARPCT to 
either seize or assassinate terrorist suspects hiding Mogadishu (Hoehne, 2009). The US financed 
the alliance and in the beginning of 2006, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) started directing 
between $100 000 and $150 000 to the ARPCT monthly. A Virginia based private military 
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company was also used for the provision of the needed military equipment. While this support 
was given under a condition that the ARPCT would deliver terrorist suspects; the Alliance used 
much of it to fight for Mogadishu’s control. They did however conduct a series of kidnappings 
and assassinations of religious figures, which only served to increase the popularity of extremists 
and anti-American attitudes or sentiments. Extremist groups in turn embarked on their own 
assassinations, targeting Somali opponents, especially journalists and foreign aid workers (ibid). 
Still collaborating with Ethiopia during April 2007, more than 200 FBI and CIA agents in 
created an anti-terrorism base of operations in the Addis Ababa Sheraton Hotel. Terrorist 
suspects were both detained and interrogated from this base. The dozen suspects provided by 
Ethiopia were however no Al-Qaeda suspects.  A number of them were merely fighters from the 
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Thus similar to the ARPCT who used the US’s 
resources and support for their own interests, Ethiopia also used the US’s anti-terrorist 
programmes to serve their own interests either to defeat or punish their domestic adversaries. 
Besides the money spent on the ARPCT and on other local warlords in Mogadishu who were 
paid to fight the CIC militias, the US has spent $650 million in security operations from 2007 to 
2012 in Somalia. A bulk of these funds were directed to the equipping, arranging of military 
intelligence for defensive purposes, training and supporting the Ugandan and Burundian forces 
who became the main militia force of AMISOM (Hoehne, 2009). Thousands of Somalis have 
lost their lives and beyond a million have been displaced due to the war on terror (Elmi, 2010). 
Islamic extremists have existed in Somalia from the early 1990s. Interactions between them and 
other international Islamists and extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda have also existed since this 
period. Back in 1992, a prominent Al-Qaeda official, Mohamed Atef visited Somalia most 
probably in an attempt to forge an alliance. A number of other Al-Qaeda authorities were also 
deployed to Somalia during this period to institute an operational base for the group. All pursuits 
however failed. Having been declared collapsed and stateless, Somalia still could not be used as 
a safe haven and terrorist operating grounds. Al-Qaeda was confronted by similar difficulties as 
those confronted by interventionist from the US and the UN humanitarian and military 
interventions in Somalia during 1992 to 1995. They were treated with distrust for they were not 
only foreigners but also followed a different form of Islam than the one prevalent in Somalia. 
Similar to the UN and US interventionists, they also encountered problems with the constantly 
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changing alliances between the clans and sub-clans and were limited by Somalia’s feeble 
infrastructure (Hoehne, 2009). Post the intervention from the US with the assistance of Ethiopia, 
extremism has increased with more people willing to join and embark on extreme measures to 
halt these two invading foreign powers (ibid). 
Al Shabaab has been the most prominent of the groups to be radicalized in the face of the 
invasion from Ethiopia and US’s war on terror. This group was initially the military youth wing 
of the CIC.  Post their rejection of the CIC’s participation in the Djibouti peace process; they 
broke away from the larger CIC to be an independent militia group (Burgess 2013). The group is 
organized in two wings. It has the military arm referred to as the Jaysh Al-Usra (translated as the 
army of hardship) and a law and order arm referred to as Jaysh Al-Hesbah (translated as the 
army of morality) (Elliot & Holzer, 2009). It has been able to provide a number of social and 
security services in regions they controlled in Somalia. These include food and alms distribution, 
employment, local-level administration and public works through repairing roads and building 
bridges, justice and security and education and training. The Islamic schools (madrassas) they 
have set up have however been alleged to be indoctrinating children through their use of radical 
teachings and encouraging children to join the movement (Mwangi, 2012). 
During food scarcity and drought, the movement played a vital role in distributing money, food 
and water to the vulnerable and affected communities. This it ensured through setting up food 
distribution centres and through collecting money from the communities it controlled and 
subsequently redistributes it to the most deprived (Mwangi, 2012). The group imposed rigorous 
and strict rules and regulations but still achieved a great degree of stability in areas they 
controlled. These areas could not thus be designated as anarchic or lawless. It is true that there 
were severe restrictions and firm control, but there was greater safety and stability as long as 
people abide by the rules (Harper, 2012). The Al-Shabaab is a very secretive movement and has 
internal ideological divisions. It is thus difficult to accurately ascertain what they are fighting for 
and under whose direction (Harper, 2012) or influence. Worsening the situation still, is their 
ever-changing ideology and leadership. The US has however regarded the entire group to be a 
terrorist organization and has officially listed it as such in their international terrorist list (Elmi, 
2010), a misunderstanding that has helped radicalize the group. This misunderstanding has been 
captured by Ken Menkhaus in his article titled ‘Misdiagnosis of Collapsed States and Terrorist’. 
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Menkhaus admitted that as outside observers, they may have been misguided in their 
assumptions and conclusions made regarding the correlation between failed states and terrorists. 
Somalia has assisted in revealing this misjudgment. Interventions in a form of nation-building in 
Somalia are thus based on a misdiagnosed connection between collapsed states and terrorism 
(Menkhaus, 2003). 
The outcome of interventions in Somalia can be compared with the outcome of a similar 
intervention or an invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. Still motivated by similar anti-terrorists 
operations, the US reasoned that to dismantle al-Qaeda which had admitted responsibility for the 
9/11 attacks; they needed to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. They achieved this 
through the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which would 
supervise military operations in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the US troops invaded in an effort to achieve three specified goals, to overthrow the Taliban, 
import security and rebuild the failed state of Afghanistan (Wittmeyer, 2013). The rational used 
was the same as that used in Somalia. Since Afghanistan was a failed state, it posed terrorism 
threats to the West and to the world at large as its lacked control over its entire territories which 
warranted that terrorist groups thrived in uncontrolled territories. A stable, effective, Weberian 
state regime therefore needed to be established to curb these threats. Their state building logic 
was however flawed and isolated from the Afghan reality. The foundations of ideas such as the 
rule of law and civil society “had only the most indirect application to the way justice was 
administered and accepted in the villages where 80 percent of Afghans lived” (Wittmeyer, 
2013:1). During the International Conference on Afghanistan held on December 2011 at Bonn, 
Germany; the Taliban was deliberately not given a seat, an action which failed to observe that 
however unpleasant to admit, the Taliban were still representatives of some segments of the 
Afghan society. There are a number of other inappropriate solutions that the West employed in 
Afghanistan. These include the abolishing of a respected Afghan monarchy; a decision that a 
large number of Afghans were against and giving Afghanistan a very centralized constitution. 
This resulted in a number of Afghans who were initially against the Taliban to turn and support it 
so as to oppose the invading NATO and US military forces (Greentree, 2013). The solutions 
applied were incompatible with realities on the ground resulting in negligible changes and a 
number of lives lost in the military struggle and confrontation (ibid). 
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Another group that has fallen under the ambits of being regarded as terrorists in Somalia is the 
Somali pirates. Back in 2008, the International Maritime Bureau reported that Somali pirates had 
captured 42 ships out of the 111 record number they had attacked (International Maritime 
Bureau, 2008). International organisations such as the EU, the Combined Maritime Force, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 16 other individual countries consequently sent 
24 warships to guard the Somali coast infested by Somali pirates (Elmi, 2010).  This increase of 
piracy at the coast of Somalia has been reported to be a direct reaction to the toxic-waste 
dumping and illegal fishing in this coastline. Somali pirates have complained about the 
exploitation and abuses of native Somali fisherman by foreign ships fishing in the region 
illegally. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization have also reported that over 700 foreign 
ships have been illegally fishing in the Somali coast since 2005 
(www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/FI-CP_SO/en.). The international community has 
nonetheless done little to remedy this, which has only served as a motivation to the Somali 
pirates to continue with their attacks directed against foreign vessels (Elmi, 2010). A Somali 
writer Mohamud Khalif has questioned the French Navy Commander based in East Africa on 
whether French forces and other forces stationed to secure the Indian Ocean were going to 
protect Somali waters against the illegal fisherman and toxic-waste dumpers in the coast who can 
comparably be regarded as foreign pirates. The commander responded by maintaining that his 
forces were not mandated to do that (ibid). The Somali pirates’ undertakings do have negative 
effects to the general Somali population. Among the attacked and captured ships are ships 
delivering commercial products and food aid resulting in higher prices of domestic food prices 
(Elmi, 2010). 
3.9 The current federal government of Somalia  
The TFG's provisional mandate ended on 20 August 2012, at this same time; the Federal 
Parliament of Somalia was instated, paving a way for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) 
to be established. Although the peaceful installation of the FGS is regarded as a major milestone 
and success; irregularities claimed to be employed by the president and his allies within the 
government have brought discontent to a number of parties. Words such as corrupt, unreliable, 
incompetent and dangerous have been used to describe the FGS president and an array of his 
senior officials (Fatah, 2013). The administration is held to be failing to achieve crucial political, 
and security objectives and wasting valuable time on clan politics which have a potential to 
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regress the country back to the 1990s civil war (ibid). Other quarrels have erupted between the 
FGS and the federal states that have concerns about federalism in Somalia. Disparities about 
federalism still exist. On one side, there are clans who advocate for a unitary Somali state that 
can challenge external states like Ethiopia who habitually intrude in their internal affairs. On the 
other side are clans who are fearful that a unitary state can easily be manipulated and state 
control become vested in one clan or a certain group of clans whilst marginalizing the rest 
(Uluso, 2014).  
3.10 Maintaining order and general governance albeit being proclaimed as collapsed  
As held above, Somalia was declared a collapsed state in 1991 post the demise of Barre’s 
regime. It is argued that in environments of state collapse, social order is not sustained and 
societal solidity is not improved. This leads to the beginning of moral decay and accordingly 
anarchy becomes a norm. The state ought to then transform the society, reinstate and preserve 
social order and societal solidity in order to re-establish its legitimacy and its right to govern 
(Mwangi, 2012). This moral decay and societal breakdown has not however occurred in Somalia. 
Instead, different societal groups have been able to provide governance, security and implement 
regulatory rules to manage everyday life of the populace. Far from anarchy, since 1991, the 
Somali society has continued to function on the foundation of kinship, customary law and 
Islamic law (Sharia). The best results of these are mostly noticeable in the northern part of 
Somalia. There, Somali elders together with businessmen have produced a functioning 
democratic state of Somaliland and beside it, an operational self-governing region of Puntland 
(de Wall, 2012). This they attained through turning their communities’ vibrant business sector, 
traditional values, their clan system and Islamic law into centers and forces of stability. 
Furthermore, in Somaliland, there have been a number of democratic events and functioning 
systems of governance achieved peaceably. These include two nonviolent changes in 
government post free and fair presidential elections in 1997 and 2003 (ibid), a constitutional 
referendum in 2001, local and district council’s elections in 2002 and upon the unexpected death 
of President Mohamed Egal in the same year, accomplished a nonviolent constitutional transfer 
of power to another president (Hesse, 2011). With substantiate success, the government of 
Somaliland has also oversaw the demobilization of rival militias, facilitated the reconstruction of 
infrastructure including functioning hospitals, clinics, schools, universities, power plants, roads 
and ports (ibid). 
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Somaliland has been improving economically and has been fairly stable since the 1993 
conference in Borama (Walls, 2009). Instead of participating in the number of peace conferences 
held in a quest to resolve the conflict in Somalia, Somaliland maintained a strategy of non-
involvement. It instead pursued an internal consensus-based process of mediation and 
deliberation (Walls, 2009). It held a number of its own local reconciliation sessions using the 
elders with authority to represent their clans to negotiate peace-building approaches to be utilized 
to resolve outstanding issues. The task of conflict resolution has always been the responsibility 
of the elders in Somaliland. The selection of these elders is based on their personal qualities such 
as age, proficiency in the region’s politics, negotiation skills, persuasion, debating skills, 
religious knowledge, faithfulness, courage, cooperation, fairness, and skill as a poet. In this 
regard, “not all old men are elders, nor are all elders aged” (Ahmed, 2010:28). Somaliland has 
utilized both modern and traditional or customary institutions of governing, an arrangement that 
has termed a hybrid political order (Boege et al., 2008). Traditional institutions are through the 
councils of elders (guurti) whilst modern institutions are ensured through elections, a parliament 
and a president. Owing to the positive they played in conflict resolution and peace building, clan 
elders are currently constitutionally inserted in the political system of Somaliland (ibid). While 
the nationwide peace conferences were highly publicized and sponsored by the UN, local level 
or grassroots peacemaking processes and initiatives did not receive much attention and in fact 
many were opposed by the UN and other international agencies (Ahmed, 2010).  
While the region of Somaliland is the most improved in terms of provision of security, stability 
and other public services; other regions are also functioning as practical political units with 
different degrees of success (Harper, 2012). The southern and central regions have evolved into a 
range of localized forms of authorities that include clan-based militias, traditional authorities and 
business people (Bakonyi, 2013).  For an example, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in 
the south-western regions of Bay and Bakool has managed to perform a number of supposed 
core governmental functions in these regions. It provides security, implements local legal codes, 
provide judicial services and has established a taxing system to finance and sustain these services 
(ibid). The apparent fact emanating from these realities in Somalia is that these local polities, be 
they be extended families or clans are the major entities regulating the social, political and 
economic life of Somalis. A constant fact with all these systems of governance is that in all 
regions where they are used, they come with is a great dependence on non-state actors or social 
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forces rooted in the configuration of Somali society to maintain security. These particularly 
include clan elders or sheikhs (which is an Arab chief or leader of a family, tribe or village) 
(ibid). With all the internal distortions in this conflict-ravaged country, it has been able to 
respond to the diminished officially recognized state by resuscitating informal, typically clan-
based security and ruling mechanisms. In the Republic of Somaliland, there exists a polity 
possessing all the aspects of a modern nation state except international recognition (Harper, 
2012).  
The economy throughout Somalia has also been surprisingly booming. In reality, it is stronger 
than the more stable neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya (Little, 2003). In his book, Economy 
without state, Peter Little preludes the paradoxes he encountered writing the book. He writes “it 
has been difficult to match the descriptions of chaos, hunger, and anarchy that frequently appear 
in the Western media with my own accounts of Somali social and economic life” (Little, 2003: 
xv). The agricultural sector through livestock in particular has improved considerably; this is 
owing to the fact that the nomads looking after the camels, goats, sheep and cows maintain a 
lifestyle that has less to do with the central authority. They have their own traditional social legal 
and economic structures which ignore a formal centralized state and national borders (Harper, 
2012). Consequently, post the fall of a central government, business in the trading of livestock 
was not affected but instead boomed without any hindrances from a central authority. Herders 
had always deeply relied on social relationships and kinship for access to markets. Order in these 
business activities is also maintained without the central government (Little, 2003). Still more 
surprising for what is regarded as a collapsed poor state, Somalia has been able to attract a 
number of large corporations. Agricultural based companies from Italy and the US (Dole Fruit 
Inc.) have invested in Somalia’s agricultural sector; other companies such as DHL, General 
Motors, and Coca-Cola are all operational in Somalia (ibid). The fact that these and many more 
multinational corporations are willing to do business in Somalia indicates that Somalia can 
provide the required basic security of property rights and economic freedom (Powell et al., 
2008). It is however still worth noting that there is still infighting and advances accomplished 
differ from region to region, some still need to improve whilst others are doing reasonably well 
(ibid). Using Weber’s definition of the state however, all these improvements, no matter their 
importance in improving the lives of the population are themselves seen as failure for their 
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attained through social institutions instead of through the state which ought to have monopolized 
power. 
3.11 The shortfalls of the misconceptions underpinning the state failure theory   
By 2010, Somalia had had a sum of twenty peace conferences which had not yielded any 
substantial changes to the political struggles of the country (Elmi, 2010). Recurrent interventions 
kept insisting on state centric operatives, abiding by the state failure recommendations of 
strengthening institutional capacities and monopolizing the instruments of power. They have 
been geared to equip the state and its security forces, a strategy supported by the argument that 
claims weak governance institutions can lead to both deterioration and a renewal of a conflict, it 
is thus important to aim for a strong bureaucracy in rebuilding failed states (Mwangi, 2012). 
Equally essential is the reestablishment of the state’s coercive capacity so as to ensure peace is 
built. Therefore, the agenda ought to be building the state’s capacity particularly, a professional 
and meticulous security force (Elmi, 2010). This is deduced from the Weberian definition of the 
state which operates above the society acting as a policing body which is not influenced by the 
society. In a country like Somalia, where the state does not necessarily abide by this definition, 
state centric interventions are likely and have been failing to achieve peace. At a foundation 
level, nomadic realities of Somalia work against the Weberian form of a state which requires a 
settled or stable population to work properly. It is challenging to control, tax, represent or 
generally govern constituencies that are always moving, sometimes even across international 
borders (Pruner, 1997). With these realities, it is easy to thus see how different the state that 
emerges from these realities will be compared to a state that would emerge in a Weberian 
western context.  
The failed states thesis assumes that the driving force of failure exists only within the respective 
state or society. This prejudicially overlooks the fact that states are implanted in the international 
system (Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009) which means the international political economy and other 
transnational players affect individual states. The assumption that forces of failure are only to be 
found within allow for the inaccurate conclusion that institutional breakdown is directly linked to 
societal breakdown. Therefore, when institutions are eroded, anarchy thrives in the society (ibid), 
an assumption that Somalia has proved to be false, as explained above. The thesis also comes 
with culturally specific presumptions regarding what a functioning state ought to look like. 
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Western states are cast as the model of successful statehood. Therefore whether regarded as 
having failed or not, in the state failure thesis, African states are contrasted with a model of 
statehood that is firmly based on western principles, practices and organization structures (Hill, 
2007). There is also no distinct definition of what a failed state is. A failed state can be any state 
which displays a number of but not necessarily all of stipulated indicators of failure. This makes 
it possible to place any state in this realm undeservedly. The state failure concept echoes similar 
assumptions as those of the modernization theory which proved to be problematic (Call, 2008).   
Both theses presume that there exists a specific upright endpoint of which states ought to move 
or progress towards, and that this progression is somehow natural. Going slightly farther than the 
modernization theory, the failed state theory presumes that at one point, all states held successful 
statuses. This we learn in Rotberg’s description of a failed state. He holds it to be “a polity that is 
no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world” 
(Rotberg, 2004:6). Whilst this description supposes that at a particular past time, all states were 
able to achieve this, in actuality, many of the so called failed states have never been as efficient 
as presumed. They never had the monopoly of power; other social services and security in such 
states have always been provided through other forms of authority like religious authorities, 
tribes and local strongmen (Call, 2008).     
The definition of failed states is furthermore ahistorical, neglecting the far-reaching history of 
colonialism, its colonial institutions which came with prevailing legacies and the exploitation of 
resources in much of the states regarded as presently failing (Call, 2008). Although the supposed 
failing states are from different settings and have different struggles, the theory sees them as 
homogenous. Consequently, the policy for interventions has been the same producing one size 
fits all solutions. For instance, the Fund for Peace (FSI) advises that  while policy makers have to 
pursue a variety of solutions for state failure, more attention has to be paid to establishing state 
institutions mainly, the ‘core five’ institutions being, “the military, police, civil service, 
leadership and the system of justice” (The Fund of Peace, 2013:1). These institutions are held as 
the answer for all failed states, albeit the differences in causes of failure in individual states and 
the 41 different indicators of failure used by the Fund of Peace (Call, 2008). In all cases, what is 
pursued is reinforcing stability and order, even if the prevailing order is unjust. This blanketing 
rationale is dangerous as shown by Structural Adjustment programmes that were implemented in 
poor countries during the 1990s to aid development but achieved the opposite (ibid). 
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To conclude, Harper (2012) best summarizes the argument put forward in this dissertation, she 
maintains that the fact that Somalia does not correspond to any familiar paradigm of statehood 
does not necessary qualifies it to be in a state of total breakdown. It is true that hardship and 
insecurity still exists in the country, it ought to, as would be in any environment confronted by a 
conflict. This however, ought-not utterly conceal the positive improvements that have emerged 
in the country since 1991 (Harper, 2012). Somalia has helped reveal that the lack of a strong 
bureaucracy does not inevitably cause anarchy nor does it entail a complete absence of other 
forms of governing institutions. There exist indigenous social institutions which do not conform 
to the ideal type western bureaucratic institutions but follow their own rules and logic. In such 
settings, the state becomes the subject of power battles that various contending social groups and 
their leaders engage in (Boege et al., 2008). Owing to the misconception of the state advocated 
for by the state failure thesis however, interventions to assist resolve the conflict in Somalia have 
only aided to worsen the situation. The obsession the theory has about security, order and control 
necessitated quick and ‘one size fits all’ resolutions. The swiftest way to create a stronger state is 
through a military intervention; which has been the most common form of intervention in the 
supposed failing or failed states. Often, these quick solutions do not necessarily depict the 
context or circumstance of that specific society (Call, 2008) and therefore rarely assist. 
Worsening the situation in Somalia was the GWOT, which resulted in a number of Somalis 
dying as the US and other allies invaded Somalia in a quest to halt Al-Qaida suspects presumed 
to be hiding in the country. This erroneous assumption was also inferred from the state failure 
theory which held that failed states have no control over all their territories, and that these 
ungoverned territories can harbor terrorists. The direct pursuing of terrorist threats backfired as it 
irritated and radicalized Somalis who consequently turned to Islam as a method to reconstitute a 
moral order. Whilst extremists or fundamentalists were previously failing to gain support in 
Somalia; post the foreign military interventions, they have since gained impetus and have been 
able to mobilize nationalist resistance (de Waal, 2012) and further compounding problems that 
Somalia is facing. The classification of failed states is furthermore reductive and fails to 
understand that since its conception, the modern state itself has always been a work in progress 
(Boas, 2010). The state in Africa and in Somalia specifically is likewise a work in progress. It is 
possible to see a different state or the same one in the near future depending on the outcome of 
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Chapter 4: Summary and concluding remarks 
4.1 Summary of chapters 
Chapter one introduced the research topic by providing an overview of the topic. It gave a 
background of the research question and outlined questions, objectives and the research 
methodology used to conduct the study. Chapter two further unpacked the concept of the state 
embedded in the state failure theory. It explained what constitutes to a state according to state 
failure theory and explained the different categories of failure with their causes and indicators. 
State failure was initially explained in general terms and then narrowed down to the failure of an 
African state. The chapter moreover explained how the 9/11 terrorists’ attacks gave momentum 
to the concept of state failure as terrorists were thought to thrive in failed states. The chapter 
finally offered another theory to denote what constitute a state instead of the notion used by the 
failed state theory. This theory is the state in society approach. The theory deems the state as just 
another institution within a given society and therefore can be influenced for it is subject to 
influences of other social forces. The state does not exist outside the society or above it. Chapter 
three provided an in-depth discussion of the supposed failure of the state of Somalia. It provided 
a brief history of Somalia to show how the state of Somalia historically operated and how the 
society related and still relate to the contemporary Somali state. It explained the different reasons 
for external interventions and their effects to Somalia. It then showed how the definition of the 
state embedded in the state failure theory does not represent the realities on the ground in 
Somalia. It explained how Somalia continued to operate and evaded anarchy albeit being 
declared a collapsed state and without a central government or a proficient bureaucracy. The 
chapter ended with a discussion of the shortfalls of the state failure theory in Somalia.  
4.2 Concluding remarks 
The misconception or misunderstanding of state failure in Africa is embedded in the 
misconception of the African state itself. Abiding by Max Weber’s definition of the state; the 
state failure thesis regards the state to be an entity that monopolizes the use of force or power 
within a defined territory (Weber, 1919).  The state is viewed as a commanding structure 
characterized by force which is used to administer, control and regulate the society (Mentan, 
2010), instead of being viewed as a force that interacts and at times get influenced by the society. 
This Weberian state differs from that described by Marx. While both Marx and Weber 
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considered the state as an instrument of force, Marx believed that political institutions, such as 
the state, arose from the societal mode of production. For Marx, the state is thus a product of the 
dominant mode of production and will differ according to the differences in this mode of 
production. Marx argues that the state favours the interests of the economically dominant class. 
State’s policies are therefore not autonomous but are completely guided by the economically 
dominant class (Mentan, 2010). Contrary to the Weberian state where the state’s interests are 
separate from those of the society, the Marxist state can and is influenced by a certain segment of 
the society (ibid), namely the capitalists/bourgeoisie. This research set to answer three specific 
questions delineated in chapter one. It set out to find the notion of the state assumed by the state 
failure theory, whether state failure theory provides an accurate account of the status and realities 
of the state of Somalia and whether the theory assists in understanding and consequently 
resolving the issues causing dispute in Somalia. Through unpacking Weber’s description of the 
state used by the state failure theory, it was made clear what notion of the state is assumed by the 
state failure theory.  
By definition, the Weberian state cannot be influenced by any segment of the society or the 
society at large. This state is founded on a rationalized bureaucracy that operates with and 
through general, impersonal and universal rules (Parkin, 2002). The possibility of an influence 
from the society is fully diminished by these sets of rules (Mentan, 2010).  Contrary to the 
Marxist notion, the state here is not simply one of the social forces within the society and 
therefore prone to being influenced by other social forces. It is instead a neutral entity, operating 
according to rational legal principles and rules. Weber delineated three forms of domination or 
types of authority that a state can exercise its power through. These are hierarchical in nature. 
The first is the charismatic domination in which the leader uses his/her charm and personal 
qualities to lead. The second form of domination is traditional domination which utilizes 
tradition and patriarchy to rule. The third form of domination is legal-rational domination which 
characterizes the modern state. The essence of this legal-rational domination is its effective 
bureaucracy. This bureaucracy has a number of characteristics; of importance is its hierarchical 
nature, being governed by rules and its recruitment of qualified and impersonal employees so as 
to avoid influences (Weber, 1958).   
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The Weberian state is meant to control and provide a range of political goods/services to the 
society. These services are hierarchically arranged with the provision of security being the most 
fundamental since security is a prerequisite to ensure the delivery of all other services or political 
goods (Rotberg, 2003). For this reason, security has been proclaimed paramount in states that 
have been regarded as failing or have failed already. Interventions concentrate on strengthening 
the state’s security institutions or forces, such as the military and police. There is however no 
universally agreed upon single term or definition to explain what state failure is. Literature on the 
subject instead consists of degrees of failure which include but not limited to failing, failed, 
collapsed, captured, weak and rouge states. Causes of failure are also as vast and a state need not 
fulfill all of the stipulated conditions but should have a certain number of them to qualify as a 
failed state (ibid). Exactly how many of these conditions a state ought to have is nonetheless not 
stipulated. The lack of a standing definition of state failure and the vast range of failure has made 
it easy to label a number of African states as failing due to their inconformity to the ideal 
Weberian state concept. The 9/11 terrorist’s attacks in the US gave momentum to the state failure 
concept and encouraged a number of western countries and organizations to organize under the 
banner of fighting terrorism, a quest which came to be referred to as the Global War of Terror 
(GWT).  
The state failure theories reason that failed states lack effective control of their territories, cannot 
provide security, improve their infrastructure or perform other state functions. They therefore 
produce political goods voids or vacuums which can be utilized by terrorist groups who in an 
attempt to get backing from the local population and to expand their operations, will offer 
personal security, economic aid and other services meant to be provided by the state government 
to the inhabitants (Piazza, 2008). This supposed correlation of terrorism and failed states meant 
that to fight terrorism, necessitated rectifying failure in the so called failed states which can 
harbour terrorists due to their lack of capacity in controlling their entire territories. Similar to the 
correlation with terrorism, state failure is also correlated with the lack of development. Sorensen 
(1999) argued that successful development requires certain preconditions which do not exist in 
fragile or failing states. With these conditions lacking, the available alternative is to import 
development enabling conditions from the western countries into African failed states. This is 
informed by state failure theory’s reasoning that lack of development is solely a result of internal 
factors. It can be as a result of corrupt leaders, lack of political will, lack of proficient 
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institutions, lack of democratic practices or lack of economic growth and effective economic 
policies which cultivates the economy (Rotberg, 2002; Zartman, 1995). For these reasons, 
interventions are constantly orientated towards fixing internal institutions and policies or 
importing them where necessary.  
This ahistorical argument of state failure in Africa is biased since it ignores the lasting legacies 
of colonialism in Africa. It moreover fails to capture the realities of the state in an African 
setting. The state failure theories neglect and overlook how African states have operated 
historically and how they have maintained their historical culture and adapted, where necessary, 
to accommodate the different challenges and realities they encountered. By focusing on state 
institutions, especially security institutions and the bureaucracy, state failure theories 
misconceive African states. This dissertation argued that the state in society approach better 
describes and depicts the realities of the African state. In this approach, the state is not defined in 
terms of what is ought to look like or what it is deemed to be; it is instead defined by what it is 
and how it operates in reality. This dissertation used Somali to illustrate the weaknesses of the 
failed state approach and the strengths of the state in society approach.  
While this dissertation argued for the inter-relatedness of the state and society, it should be noted 
that this does not mean that the state molds societal groups such that if the state weakens, its 
weakness will automatically trickle down to society. Although the state can influence the society, 
it also can be influenced by the society for it is simply an institution of society and does not exist 
outside or above it. These two institutions continually interact and the outcomes of these 
interactions are mutually transforming (Migdal, 1994), they constantly influence and reshape 
each other (Migdal, 2001). There exist strongmen, prominent figures or social groups who can 
exert enough influence to alter state policies. In Africa, there exist local organizations that fulfil 
government’s functions and negotiate these functions with their governments. This does not 
imply failure on the part of the state, but is a demonstration of the confrontations and 
negotiations between these two institutions. Where services of the state cannot reach, local 
institutions provide these services using traditional methods and institutions. The state failure 
theory however does not recognize these realities and thus believe that in the absence of the 
state’s presence, anarchy will thrive in the society since the only institution that can bring order 
is the state. The case of Somalia shows in the absence of the state non-state actors, such as 
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traditional leaders, elders, religious leaders or other society representatives, are able to provide 
basic security, order and governance at their respective local regions. The proponents of state 
failure declared Somalia a collapsed state in 1991; this logically meant that anarchy was to be a 
norm within the Somali society. This has however not been the case, for Somalia has continued 
to function on the basis of kinship, customary law and Islamic law (Sharia). The best results of 
this are mostly noticeable in the northern part of Somalia, in the state of Somaliland and 
Puntland. Other southern regions are also functioning through traditional institutions, while in 
some regions and in some war lords and business men maintain order and provide general 
governance and security (de Waal, 2012). Presenting this reality offered a response to the second 
question of this research as it reveals how the state failure theory failed to provide an accurate 
account of the status and realities of Somalia. 
Owing to the enduring conflict, internal distortions are present in Somalia. The country is 
however not in anarchy for the society has been able to respond to experienced challenges by 
resuscitating informal, mainly clan-based, security and governance mechanisms. Guided by the 
alleged link of state failure and terrorism, western policy has however constantly preferred to 
pursue direct action against alleged terrorist threats, re-creating a central government and 
establishing formal state institutions to strengthen security. This approach has failed, irritated and 
radicalized a number of Somalis (de Waal, 2012: Hoehne, 2009). These interventions have 
worsened the problem instead of providing solutions. They have “not only failed but have 
undermined local polities in the process, leaving the country worse off than before” (Menkhaus, 
2007: 83). The approach therefore does not provide assistance in understanding the causes and 
consequently possible solutions to the issues causing disputes in Somalia.  
Due to the misconceived reality of the African state in the state failure theory; interventions 
deduced from this definition are inevitably incompatible. In this paper, I have thus concurred 
with the state in society approach which defines the state as another institution within the society 
and not existing above it. The state cannot have monopoly of power, as a societal institution, it 
also has its limits. It cannot also have a static and unyielding nature as it is constantly interacting 
with other social forces. Counteractions with regards to its makeup that it receives from other 
social forces along with the absorption of other groups into its organization results in changes or 
modifications in its social and ideological foundations (Migdal, 1994).  
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The fundamental reasoning behind the state failure theory is that all states ought to function in 
the same way, and therefore can be placed on a range from good to bad (Bøa°s & Jennings, 
2005). This is however a misconception of a state. States are a culmination of distinctive 
historical processes (ibid). With different histories, the final product cannot then be expected to 
be the same. The intention of this research was not to discount the presence of a number of 
social, political and economic problems existing in Africa, for it is true that a number of 
challenges still exist in the continent. It was however to challenge their description and 
categorization as failure of the state. The presence of these challenges and conflict should not be 
confounded with the failure of the state, but be viewed as interactions and confrontations 
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